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GLOBALIZED CITIZENSHIP: SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY AND SOUL
BERTA ESPERANZA HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL*
I. INTRODUCTION
u UMAN rights law has redefined the concepts of sovereignty and citi-
.zenship. Just as transnationalization has weakened the hegemony of
the political elites (corporate economic elites and domestic ruling classes)
by strengthening citizenship claims of all persons, so, too, a globalized citi-
zenship grounded on a human rights model will strengthen personhood
by denationalizing states' claims on individuals' rights. The human rights
narrative has been imagined, crafted and delivered by Northern/Western
powers-the hegemon-however, for the human rights model to be of
utility to the globalized citizen project, it must be reconstituted with an
antisubordination agenda. It must include the voices of the marginal-
ized-both persons outside Western cultures and subordinated persons
within Western cultures-all women; racial, ethnic, religious, cultural and
sexual minorities; the poor; and the differently abled. In sum, such a new
vision of human rights refocuses the discourse and creates a globalized
citizenship movement from below that embraces and empowers those cur-
rently in the periphery.
This essay will use the reconstituted human rights paradigm to ex-
plore the relationship between sovereignty, security and personhood. Part
II engages the human rights model by recognizing how it first effected a
change in the concept of sovereignty and suggest a reconstitution to
render the human rights system truly pluralistic. As reconceived, the
human rights system provides a rich and complex foundation for a global-
ized citizenship model that promotes and respects personhood, well-being
and human flourishing. Part III explores the tension between human
rights and security, acknowledging three significant realities: (1) the nor-
mative reality that in times of danger the sovereign can suppress certain
human rights to maximize security protections for its citizens and others
within its territory; (2) the corollary legal and moral reality that even in
times of danger the sovereign cannot derogate from certain fundamental
human rights; and (3) the practical reality that the ability of the sovereign
to act in breach of the nonderogable obligations may be unassailable if the
actor is a powerful world actor. In this context, the essay addresses the
uneasy legacy of Nuremberg and its more recent delineation of the
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bounds of sovereignty-the addition of individual responsibility which
means that states cannot escape accountability by doing indirectly (via in-
dividual actors) what they cannot do directly.
Part IV moves toward a new conceptualization of limits on sover-
eignty: a proposed globalized citizenship model that draws from tradi-
tional citizenship theory, uses the human rights structure as its foundation
and places limits on the power of entities, including states and transna-
tional and multinational organizations, associations or groups, to act if the
consequence is a violation of human rights norms. This new conceptual-
ization is different from the previous conceptualizations of the limits of
sovereignty' because the affirmation emanates from the individual him/
herself (and others similarly situated around the globe) who has suffered
as a consequence of a breach of norms regardless of whether the norm
violator is a state actor. Finally, Part V applies the developed model to the
post-9/11 condition of the captives held in Guant~namo Bay, Cuba.
II. HuMAN RIGHTS-CREATING LIMITS TO SOVEREIGNTY
The contemporary human rights regime was developed after World
War II. However, even prior to that war, and in the absence of any legal
doctrine that challenged full and absolute state sovereignty, states recog-
nized that protection of humanity was the paramount goal of international
law. Thus, sovereignty, although state-centered, was not seen as absolute.
Under international law, sovereignty was always recognized as an instru-
ment that should not be used to shield abuses against human beings. In-
deed, well before World War II, Oppenheim recognized the supra-
sovereign nature of human rights:
[T] here is no doubt that, should the state venture to treat its own
subjects or part thereof with such cruelty as would stagger hu-
manity, public opinion of the rest of the world would call upon
the powers to exercise intervention with the purpose of compel-
ling such state to establish a legal order of things within its
boundaries sufficient to guarantee to its citizens an existence
more adequate to the ideals of modern civilization.2
Oppenheim's statement about the limitations of state sovereignty was
prescient. After World War II, in the Nuremberg Tribunal,3 the world
community punished German Nazis for committing atrocities against mil-
l. Specifically, the conceptualizations of the limits of sovereignty are that no
state (first conceptualization) or individual (second conceptualization) can affirm-
atively harm a citizen.
2. L. Oppenheim, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAw: TREATISE § 292, at 368-69 (2d. ed.
1912) (reprinted in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Louis B. Sohn
& Thomas Buergenthal eds., 1973)).
3. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences: Judgment,
October 1, 1946, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172 (1947) [hereinafter International Military
Tribunal (Nuremberg) ].
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lions of innocent citizens, including those against German Jews on Ger-
man soil. As a result, a state would no longer be insulated from sanction
simply because the crimes committed were against its own nationals and
within its geographic boundaries. The human rights idea challenged the
notion of unfettered state sovereignty, much as in the 1980s globalization
challenged the supremacy of the nation-state.
The human rights ideals can be traced to religion as well as natural
law and contemporary moral values. The human rights movement recog-
nizes those rights vital to an individual's existence-fundamental, inviola-
ble, interdependent, indivisible and inalienable rights that are predicates
to life as human beings and that concern the respect and dignity associ-
ated with personhood. Today, these include not only civil and political
rights, but also social, economic and cultural rights, as well as solidarity
rights-rights to peace and to a healthy environment.
The signing of the United Nations Charter 4 in 1945 marked the estab-
lishment of a system of comprehensive human rights protection for all
individuals against various forms of injustice by a state-regardless of
whether the abuse or injustice was committed by a foreign sovereign or
the individual's own state of nationality, and, for the most part, irrespec-
tive of the existence of war. The Charter, the purpose of which is "to
promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights and for fundamen-
tal freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or relig-
ion," 5 expressly acknowledges "rights to which all human beings have
been entitled since time immemorial and to which they will continue to be
entitled as long as humanity survives" as rights of personhood.
6
Numerous human rights instruments that followed the Charter fur-
ther articulate and refine the nature and breadth of the human rights
vision. These include, among others,7 the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights8 (Declaration or Universal Declaration); International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights9 (ICCPR); International Covenant on
4. U.N. CHARTER art. 1 (establishing universal system of human rights
protection).
5. Id. art. 1, para. 3 (explaining purpose and function of Charter).
6. Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather than States, 32 Am. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1982) (discussing existence of human
rights).
7. See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE OF HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, Interna-
tional Human Rights Instruments, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/intlinst.htm (last
visited July 12, 2004) (providing comprehensive list and text of other treaties that
serve to define human rights concepts).
8. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GOAR,
3d sess., Supp. No. 13, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declara-
tion] (recognizing that human beings are born with equal dignity and rights).
9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] (establishing framework for universal
system of human rights).
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 10 (ICESCR); Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women;1 1 Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion;12 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment;1 3 and the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 14 These instruments
collectively protect civil and political rights initially pursued by the French
and American revolutions-rights largely expanded to include not only
the rights to equality for white men and to "life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness," but also the rights to self-determination; nondiscrimination;
sex equality; life; freedom from torture, cruel, inhumane treatment or
punishment; freedom from slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labor;
freedom of opinion and expression; freedom of speech and assembly; and
free association.' 5 They also provide a plethora of due process rights; en-
sure freedom of movement; protect family and marriage; recognize per-
sonhood; recognize freedom of thought, conscience and religion; and
recognize the right to participate in government and to protect culture. 16
Significantly, these instruments also embrace the social, economic and cul-
tural rights sought by the Mexican and Russian revolutions, thereby mak-
ing the following rights part of the human rights framework: the rights to
good working conditions; to receive fair wages; to form trade unions; to
receive social security; to attain an adequate standard of living including
10. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (en-
tered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR] (promoting and observing
human rights that are inherent to all human beings).
11. Convention on the -Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 33 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) (establish-
ing that human rights extend equally to men and women).
12. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination,Jan. 7, 1966, 5 I.L.M. 352 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) (establish-
ing that human rights extend equally to human beings of all races).
13. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, modified, 24 I.L.M. 535
(entered into force June 20, 1987) (recognizing that certain types of torture and
other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment are considered
human rights violations).
14. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) (acknowledg-
ing genocide, regardless of whether committed at times of war, violates human
rights).
15. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 1 (self-determination); id. art. 2 (nondis-
crimination); id. art. 3 (sex equality); id. art. 6(1) (life); id. art. 7 (freedom from
torture, cruel, inhumane treatment or punishment); id. art. 8 (freedom from slav-
ery, servitude, forced or compulsory labor); id. art. 19 (freedom of opinion and
expression); id. art. 21 (freedom of assembly); id. art. 22 (free association).
16. See, e.g., id. art. 9 (due process rights); id. art. 12 (freedom of movement);
id. art. 23 (family and marriage); id. art. 10 (personhood); id. art. 18 (freedom of
thought, conscience and religion); id. art. 25 (participation in government); id.
art. 27 (protection of culture).
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food, housing and clothing; to enjoy physical and mental health; to re-
ceive an education; and to participate in cultural life. 17 Most noteworthy,
the documents, while acknowledging that the inherent dignity of people is
the foundation for freedom, justice and peace in the world, also expressly
recognize the interrelationship of civil and political rights with economic
rights: "freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are
created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights as well as
his economic, social and cultural rights."
18
Notwithstanding the laudable and desirable ideal of universality of
rights, the grounding of this articulation in Western philosophy has in-
vited critique. The absence of linkages to the periphery19 and claims that
a system was being imposed on states that were not present or perhaps
non-existent at the time of the system's formation challenged the authen-
ticity of the system as lacking a broad-based cultural and ideological
foundation. 20
17. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 10, art. 7(a) (fair wages); id. art. 7(b) (safe
and healthy working conditions); id. art. 8 (form trade unions); id. art. 9 (receive
social security); id. art. 11 (adequate standard of living); id. art. 12 (enjoy physical
and mental health); id. art. 13 (receive education); id. art. 15(1) (participation in
cultural life).
18. ICCPR, supra note 9, Pmbl.
19. See, e.g., MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BOR-
DERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 84-86 (1998) (noting exten-
sive participation of Latin Americans in producing Universal Declaration,
foundational document of all later human rights treaties); Linda Bosniak, Citizen-
ship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000) (discussing concept of
citizenship identity and solidarity within nation-state); Kathryn Sikkink, Reconceptu-
alizing Sovereignty in the Americas: Historical Precursors and Current Practices, 19 Hous.
J. INT'L L. 705 (1997) (discussing transformation and reconceptualization of sover-
eignty); Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and
Human Rights: A New Model of International Politics Is Needed to Explain the Politics of
Human Rights, 31 POL. ScI. & POL. 516, 517 (1998) (arguing for model, called
"'neo-medievalism, where non-state actors begin to undermine state sovereignty
and a new system with 'overlapping authority and multiple loyalty"'); Ruth Phil-
lips, Stakeholders on the Periphery of Citizenship in NGO/Corporate Engagement, July 9,
2003, at http://www.sprc.unsw.edu.au/ASPC2003/papers/PaperlI3.pdf (address-
ing how northern non-government organization advocacy processes risk leaving
some citizens on periphery).
20. See generally WILLIAM T. DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CON-
FUCIAN COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998) (discussing development and impact
of universal human rights from Asian perspective); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN
RiGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY (2001) (discussing different culture can have
different perspectives on purpose and content of human rights); BALAKRISHNAN
RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENTS, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS,
AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003) (discussing human rights from Third World
perspective); David Kennedy, Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights: The Interna-
tional Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 99 (2002)
(questioning international human rights origins and inclusiveness); Makau Mutua,
Terrorism and Human Rights: Power, Culture, and Subordination, 8 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L.
REv. 1 (2002) (discussing human rights from post 9-11 context as well as renewed
American and European domination); Shashi Tharoor, Are Human Rights Univer-
sal?, NEW INTERNATIONALIST No. 332, 2001, at http://www.newint.org (questioning
20051 1013
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The reconfiguration and transformation of the human fights project
into a truly inclusive and pluralistic paradigm of dignity and personhood is
necessary ontologically prior to the development of a globalized citizen-
ship model. A reconstitution of the human rights system must include
perspectives and understandings from different cultures and economies in
order to explore the boundaries of rights in a nonessentialist, an-
tisubordination posture and to attain its liberatory potential so that all-
from North and South, East and West alike-can share and enjoy full
personhood.
Critical analysis exposes the structural flaws, biases and assumptions
of applying a hegemonic version of human rights law. Existing interna-
tional ideas and ideals were crafted within specific and narrow social, eco-
nomic, historical and cultural spaces. The universalization of the system
resulted in the effective imposition on many states of the perspectives,
needs, desires, interests and experiences of a few powerful ones, and thus
effectively silenced the subaltern, the poor and the subordinated; the core
silenced the periphery. The coexistence of slavery and women's status as
chattel, as well as the decimation and exploitation of indigenous popula-
tions, with the late eighteenth century political and social uprisings that
sought to identify impermissible governmental intrusions into individual
lives and to protect the rights to private property, life and liberty, repre-
sents intrinsic contradiction, the irreconciliative tension imbuing those
revolutions.
Vestiges of foundational inequities are evident at the start of the
twenty-first century. Women lack equal rights and benefits in every geog-
raphy of the global community. Racial, sexual, and ethnic minorities in
the first-world states, all people in third-world states and indigenous peo-
ple in all states-North and South, East and West alike-experience a
widespread pattern of inequality in participation in social, political and
economic spheres.
One of the central aims of the human rights system is liberation and
justice for the subordinated, the disempowered, the marginalized and sub-
altern persons and communities. These borderlands include not only all
peoples (and particularly the non-elites) in the peripheral states-pre-
cisely the societies claiming exclusion from the standards-generating pro-
cess-but also non-normative, outsider communities within core societies.
The human rights paradigm, refocused and reconstituted, becomes a mor-
ally compelling tool that denounces all sovereign action derogating from
or interfering with personhood.
III. SECURITY AND THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY
One of the central functions of any state, especially those states
founded on civic republicanism as quintessentially expressed by the Amer-
whether in our multicultural world, human rights can ever be universal and
affective).
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ican and French Declarations, is to provide security for its citizens-one of
those state functions that would be wholly unworkable if maintained in
individual hands. Thus, the security of persons was one of the obligations
conceptually delegated to the states by the people in the "social
contract."21
In this context, it is important to explore the relationship of human
rights to the state's sovereign obligation to defend its citizens. The ICCPR
expressly addresses this concern. Article 4(1) establishes six onerous con-
ditions that predicate security concerns trumping rights of personhood:
(1) a public emergency must exist; (2) it must threaten the life of the
nation; (3) the public emergency must have been officially proclaimed;
(4) the derogation of rights must be necessary vis-a-vis existing circum-
stances; (5) the measures taken that derogate from the protected rights
cannot be inconsistent with other obligations of the state; and (6) under
no circumstances can discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, lan-
guage, religion or social origin be the grounds for the derogation. 22 Be-
yond these listed requirements, article 4(2) of the ICCPR also expressly
prohibits derogation from certain rights even during public emergencies
that threaten the life of the nation. 23 Such nonderogable rights include:
(1) the right to life; (2) the right to be free from torture or cruel, inhu-
mane or degrading treatment or punishment, including the right not to
be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation without consent; (3)
the prohibition against slavery and servitude; (4) the prohibition against
imprisonment merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual
obligation; (5) the prohibition against imposing criminal punishment
based on ex post facto laws; (6) the right to personhood; and (7) the right
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.2 4
Thus, beyond the curtailment of the state's sovereign power effected
by human rights norms generally, international norms also expressly con-
strain the state's sovereign power to derogate from individual rights-
rights of personhood-for security reasons. To be sure, history is replete
with examples of states that did not conform to the nonderogation princi-
ple. However, inconsistencies abound with respect to which states are con-
demned for such derogations. Criticism seems to be aimed more freely at
weaker, rather than powerful, states. In all cases, honoring the norm in
the breach does not negate the existence of the norm.
21. HuMAN RIGHTS IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION 1600-PREsENr (John A. Maxwell
&JamesJ. Friedberg eds., 1994) [hereinafter HuMAN RIGHTS] (citingJEAN-JAcQUES
RoussEAu, SocIAL CoNTRAcT (G.D.H. Cole ed., 1950)) (reprinting excerpts from
many of most significant pieces forming foundation of Western human rights idea,
including Magna Carta, Locke's Second Treatise of Civil Government, American Decla-
ration of Independence, French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen,
Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France and Paines' The Rights of Man).
22. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 4(1).
23. Id. art. 4(2).
24. Id. (referring to articles 6, 7, 8(1), 8(2), 11, 15, 16 and 18).
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In scrutinizing the sovereign and security prerogatives of states, it is
appropriate to examine the Nuremberg Tribunal, a watershed event for
human rights. Nuremberg marks a historical moment in defining when a
state's sovereignty veil may be pierced vis-a-vis its treatment of human be-
ings (including its own citizens), outside and within its borders at a time of
war when security interests are at a high water-mark. A critical analysis
serves to problematize its procedural and substantive foundations.
The United Nations Charter, which first centered human rights in the
international legal system, was a document setting out an ambitious but
general plan. 25 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal2 6 (Tri-
bunal Charter), on the other hand, was concrete and specific to the cir-
cumstances providing for prosecutions, convictions and punishment of
real people for real crimes. The Tribunal Charter resulted in trials of indi-
viduals for heinous crimes that were committed during the war years. The
bases for these trials were, in part, grounded in existing international law
such as the Hague Convention of 1907,27 which prohibited certain meth-
ods of waging war, and the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact,28 which renounced
aggressive war and war as an instrument of national policy. Some concepts
and norms designed for the prosecution, conviction and punishment of
"war criminals," however, represented significant developments of the law
and confirmed emerging fundamental international human rights norms.
A unique aspect of Nuremberg is that the trial and judgment process
applied international law doctrines and concepts in order to impose crimi-
nal punishments on individuals for their commission of one of three types
of crimes under international law: (1) crimes against peace; 29 (2) war
25. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 4.
26. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm [hereinafter Tribu-
nal Charter] (establishing International Military Tribunal to hear trials and punish
war criminals of European axis and articulating crimes and appropriate
punishments).
27. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910) [hereinafter
Hague Convention] (prohibiting certain methods of waging war).
28. Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, available at http://www.yale.edu/law-
web/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm (providing for renunciation of war as instrument of
national policy).
29. See Tribunal Charter, supra note 26, art. 6(a) ("namely, planning, prepara-
tion, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of interna-
tional treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing").
1016 [Vol. 50: p. 1009
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crimes;3 0 and (3) crimes against humanity.31 In dispensing justice, viola-
tions of previously existing international laws were analyzed. In the pre-
war days, there existed two "universal" crimes. One, piracy on the high
seas, was based on the interests of all states to protect navigation against
interference on the high seas outside the territory of any state. Because
there existed no international criminal tribunal with jurisdiction over
these matters, however, prosecutions were carried out in state courts. Sec-
ond, breach of the humanitarian laws of war, was found in customary
norms, treaties and concepts such as 'just war." It was grounded on states'
interests that combatants follow restrictive rules of war.
Yet at the time of the trials at Nuremberg, the concept of individual
criminal responsibility had not been systematically developed except in
the context of piracy. Certainly, the individual responsibility concept
gained a new prominence and a clearer definition after Nuremberg, pri-
marily through the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their 1977
Protocols.3
2
The Nuremberg Tribunal was possible because after World War II the
prevailing Allied states were able to dictate policies aimed at Germans who
30. See id. art. 6(b). This article states:
namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to
slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occu-
pied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on
the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wan-
ton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity[.]
Id.
31. See id. art. 6(c). Article 6(c) states:
namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other in-
humane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during
the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execu-
tion of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country
where perpetrated[.]
Id.
32. There are four conventions known collectively as the Geneva Conventions
of 1949. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct.
21, 1950); Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [here-
inafter Convention III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force
Oct. 21, 1950). Additionally, there are two protocols known as the 1977 Protocols
to the Geneva Conventions. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into
force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol II].
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were responsible for the war and for the barbarity of the acts perpetrated.
The applicable policies were developed in various conferences and
culminated in the London Agreement3 3 in which the victorious parties
accorded constitution of an International Military Tribunal for the trial of
war criminals.3 4 The Tribunal Charter provided for the composition and
basic procedures for the tribunal. 35 The Tribunal's structure itself is tell-
ing: Article 2 allowed for four judges, one from each of the victorious Al-
lied powers-Britain, United States, France and Russia.
3 6
At the heart of the Tribunal Charter is the concept of the existence of
international crimes for which there can be individual responsibility.
37
The adopted definition went beyond traditional war crimes in two ways.
First, it included war-related crimes against peace.3 8 Second, the notion
33. London Agreement, Aug. 8, 1945, available at http://www.yale.edu/law-
web/avalon/imt/proc/imtchart.htm (agreement by United States, Provisional
Government of French Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for prosecution and punishment
of major war criminals of European Axis).
34. Id. art. 1 ("There shall be established after consultation with the Control
Council for Germany an International Military Tribunal for the trial of war
criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical location whether they be
accused individually or in their capacity as members of the organizations or groups
or in both capacities."); id. art. 2 ("The constitution, jurisdiction and functions of
the International Military Tribunal shall be those set in the CHARTER annexed to
this Agreement, which CHARTER shall form an integral part of this Agreement.");
see also Tribunal Charter, supra note 26, art. 6 ("The Tribunal established by the
Agreement . ..for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the
European Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish persons who, act-
ing in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as
members of organizations ....").
35. See Tribunal Charter, supra note 26, passim.
36. See id. art. 2 ("The Tribunal shall consist of four members, each with an
alternate. One member and one alternate shall be appointed by each of the
Signatories.").
37. See id. art. 6. Article 6 states:
The Tribunal . . .shall have the power to try and punish persons who,
acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individ-
uals or as members of organizations, committed any of the following
crimes. The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsi-
bility .... Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating
in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to com-
mit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by
any persons in execution of such plan.
Id.; see also id. art. 7 ("The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State
or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as
freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment."); id. art. 8 ("The fact
that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior
shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of pun-
ishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.").
38. See id. art. 6(a). For a list of those crimes, see supra note 30 and accompa-
nying text.
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that individuals could commit crimes against humanity emerged.3 9 Also,
in the past, war crimes could be committed only by official combatants
who represented the state.
40
The substantive criminal provisions appeared in Articles 6 through 8
of the Tribunal Charter. Article 6 defined the actions for which there
would be individual responsibility, including crimes against peace; war
crimes, defined as "violations of the laws or customs of war;" and crimes
against humanity, which included murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian pop-
ulation or prosecutions on political, racial or religious grounds. 41 Article
7 provided that the official position of the defendants was irrelevant to
ascertaining their responsibility or mitigation of punishment.4 2 Article 8
provided that actions pursuant to the order of a government or a superior
would not shield an individual actor from responsibility, but could be con-
sidered as mitigation in punishment.
43
In this context, it is appropriate to analyze the challenges and objec-
tions-both procedural and substantive-to the Nuremberg Tribunal.
One challenge invoked the fundamental principle of law that there could
be no punishment of a crime without a preexisting law, noting that ex post
facto punishment is abhorrent to the law of all civilized nations. Article 15
of the ICCPR later confirmed this norm: "[n] o one shall be held guilty of
any criminal offense on account of any act or omission which did not con-
stitute a criminal offense, under national or international law, at the time
when it was committed."4 4 Germans claimed that the Tribunal Charter's
provisions violated the prohibition against passing ex post facto laws because
no sovereign power had made aggressive war a crime at the time the al-
leged criminal acts were committed, no statute had defined aggressive war,
no penalty had been fixed for the commission of aggressive war and no
court had been created to try and punish offenders.4 5 The German posi-
tion arose from the Nazi conception of "total war" that renders everything
subordinate to war.46 The Nazis believed that prisoners of war could be
ill-treated, tortured and murdered in disregard of international law and
dictates of humanity because, under the concept of "total war," rules and
39. See Tribunal Charter, supra note 26, art. 6(c). For a discussion of the Ge-
neva Conventions, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
40. For the language of that requirement, see supra note 31 and accompany-
ing text.
41. See Tribunal Charter, supra note 26, art. 6. For further discussion, see
supra notes 30-32, 38 and accompanying text.
42. See Tribunal Charter, supra note 26, art. 7. For a discussion of the individ-
ual responsibility aspects, see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
43. See Tribunal Charter, supra note 26, art. 8. For further discussion, see
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
44. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 15(1).
45. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), supra note 3, at 217 (citing
Tribunal Charter, supra note 26).
46. See id. at 224.
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regulations were trumped by the war.4 7 Similarly, the fate suffered by civil-
ian populations-deportation for slave labor, murder, plundering and pil-
laging of public and private property, and the wanton destruction without
military justification or necessity of cities, towns and villages-were subor-
dinated to the "total war" concept. 48 But while "some observers will con-
tend that in 'total war' there can be no laws regulating military conduct
... ; international lawyers will point out that there is no such legal concept
as 'total war'... [as] the laws of war apply without exception to all wars."'49
Notwithstanding these objections, the Nuremberg Tribunal-perhaps
not surprisingly as it was made up of only Tribunal Charter members-
upheld the legality of both the creation of the Tribunal Charter and its
application to the perpetrators. 50 First, the Nuremberg Tribunal noted
that the creation of the Tribunal Charter constituted the proper "exercise
of sovereign legislative power by countries to which the German Reich
unconditionally surrendered." 5 1 The Nuremberg Tribunal did not inter-
rogate or challenge the right of the victors to legislate for the occupied
territories, but rather simply observed that such a right had been recog-
nized by the civilized world and that "the maxim of nullum crimen sine lege is
not a limitation of sovereignty, but ... [rather] a principle of justice."5 2
Moreover, the Nuremberg Tribunal rejected the characterization of
the Tribunal Charter as an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the
victorious nations, and embraced it as the expression of international law
on aggressive war that already existed at the time of its creation. 5 3 Specifi-
cally, the Tribunal Charter cited to the Kellogg-Briand Pact-a treaty bind-
ing on sixty-three states, including Germany and Japan, when World War
II broke out in 1939-and it noted that a state that signs a pact renounc-
ing aggressive war as an instrument of national policy and then engages in
such aggressive war is in breach of the agreement.54 The renunciation of
war as an instrument of national policy renders such a war illegal under
international law.
55
The Nuremberg Tribunal concluded it was not unjust to punish those
who attacked neighboring states without warning in defiance of treaties,
because the attacker should have known that the attacker's actions were
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. Anthony D'Amato, Law and War: A Doctrine of Deterrence, 35 U.N. CHRON.
52, 52-53 (1998) (discussing legal fallacy of "total war").
50. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), supra note 3, at 216 (citing
Tribunal Charter, supra note 26).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 216-17.
53. See id. at 216 (noting view of Tribunal Charter in Nuremberg Tribunal).
54. See id. at 217 (discussing Pact which "condemned recourse to war for the
future as an instrument of policy" and noting implications of signing Kellogg-Bri-
and Pact).
55. See id. at 218 (describing war as illegal in international law with criminal
consequences).
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wrong and unlawful given existing treaties and norms.5 6 Consequently, it
would be incorrect and improper to allow such conduct to go unpun-
ished. The Nuremberg Tribunal supported its conclusion by considering
the existing international law on aggressive war.
57
Further, to show that Germany's conduct in prosecuting its "total war"
violated existing norms, the Nuremberg Tribunal also cited to the Hague
Convention.5 8 The Hague Convention prohibited certain methodologies
in the waging of war, including inhumane treatment of prisoners, employ-
ment of poison weapons and improper use of flags.5 9 The Nuremberg
Tribunal noted that since 1907, not only had such actions constituted
crimes punishable as offenses against the laws of war, but also that military
tribunals had in the past tried and punished individuals who had violated
rules of land warfare set out by the Hague Convention. 60 The Nuremberg
Tribunal stated that those who waged aggressive war were doing some-
thing as illegal as, but more egregious than, acts that would constitute a
breach of the Hague Convention.
6 1
The Nuremberg Tribunal did not address the issue that some of the
belligerents were not state parties to the Hague Convention. In this re-
gard, it is appropriate to examine the role of custom in developing inter-
national law. It is clear that practice of states that is perceived as
obligatory (i.e. custom) is one of the primary sources of public interna-
tional law. 62 Custom, however, should not be judicially established by in-
terpreting treaties in a manner in which it seeks to bind an actor for
actions directly contrary to the claimed obligatory norm. Yet, the Nurem-
berg Tribunal simply observed that the Hague Convention was a revision
of the general laws and customs of war that were already in existence.
6 3
Therefore, as a codification of existing customary norms, the Hague Con-
vention was binding on all states, signatories and nonsignatories alike.
The Nuremberg Tribunal emphasized that by 1939 the rules were "recog-
nized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of
56. See id. (asserting war "has become throughout the entire world ... an
illegal thing" because of Kellogg-Briand Pact; quoting Mr. Henry L. Stimson, Sec-
retary of State of United States).
57. See id. (noting Nuremberg Tribunal's reliance on Hague Convention of
1907).
58. See id. (citing Hague Convention, supra note 27).
59. See id. (explaining that certain methods of warfare had been outlawed as
early as 1907).
60. See id. (citing Hague Convention, supra note 27).
61. See id. at 218-19 (stating Tribunal's conclusion).
62. See id. at 219 ("The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the
customs and practices of states which gradually obtained universal recognition
..... ); see also Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38
§ 1 (b), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187 (listing "international custom" as
source of law Court "shall apply").
63. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), supra note 3, at 248 (noting
purpose for Hague Convention).
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the laws and customs of war" to which the Tribunal Charter referred. 64
The Nuremberg Tribunal also concluded that the matters included in the
Tribunal Charter had been recognized as war crimes under the Hague
Convention, as well as under the Geneva Conventions. 65
Significantly, the Nuremberg Tribunal's conclusion accepts that the
law of war is to be found in treaties and in states' customs and practices
that have been universally recognized. The law of war also can be found
in general principles ofjustice thatjurists and military courts have applied.
This conclusion is of moment because it is an acknowledgment that law is
not static.
Perhaps most significant is the Nuremberg Tribunal's ruling that in-
ternational law imposes duties and liabilities not only upon states but also
upon individuals.66 In a now oft-quoted statement, the Tribunal specifi-
cally provided that: "Crimes against international law are committed by
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who com-
mit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced."6 7
With this pronouncement, the Tribunal ruled that authors and perpetra-
tors of internationally prohibited acts cannot shelter themselves behind
their official positions to avoid punishment in appropriate proceedings.
Rather, individuals have international duties that transcend national
obligations. 68
This finding of individual and state responsibility constituted the first
massive erosion of sovereignty principles affected by human rights norms.
In ascertaining the legality of a sovereign act, the question no longer
would be whether a foreign sovereign acted within its territorial bounda-
ries. Nor in ascertaining responsibility would the inquiry be whether the
individual was following orders. Instead, the question now would be
whether the acts committed by the sovereign, even within its territorial
boundaries, violate higher norms of humanity. If so, the state and the
individuals (if moral choice is possible) engaging in such acts would be
internationally responsible for wrongdoing. With the reconceived ques-
tion, the acts carried out by the Nazis on non-German and German citi-
zens alike were war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against
humanity for which the perpetrators could properly be punished.
64. Id. at 248-49.
65. See id. at 218-19 (noting war crimes established by Hague Convention); id.
at 219 (citing League of Nations 1924 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of Inter-
national Dispute, opened for signature Oct. 1, 1924, available at http://www.
canadahistory. com / sections / documents / docPacific % seattlement % 20 disputes.
htm (stating Geneva Protocol declared war of aggression as "an international
crime").
66. See id. at 220 ("That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon
individuals as well as upon States has long been recognized.").
67. Id. at 221.
68. See id. (stating international duties of individuals and loss of protection
behind official position).
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Criticisms of the Tribunal Charter and the Nuremberg decision raise
a patent tension permeating law, politics and power, which is important in
the analysis of a globalized citizenship model. This tension has several
implications. One, the tension renders clear that international legal prin-
ciples allow states, within certain parameters, to derogate from individual
rights at times of public emergencies. Two, international norms specifi-
cally impose limits on states' ability to derogate from particular rights. Fi-
nally, however, as the Nuremberg decision shows, sometimes the lines
between law and politics are blurred. When the rule of power and the
rule of law collide, the acts of the powerful may have an impact on the
exercise of rights. For example, the Nazis ran roughshod over "un-
desirables" and the Allied powers erected the necessary legal structures to
render the Nazis accountable for such transgressions.
IV. GLOBALIZED CITIZENSHIP
Human rights and economic polarization, particularly as manifested
in and exacerbated by the economic globalization of the last two decades,
have transformed the liberal conception of citizenship. 6 9 These changes
inspire the model for globalized citizenship. This model both borrows
from and redesigns traditional ideas of citizenship.
Two different concepts of citizenship exist. One, the "legal status"
model, emphasizes "full membership in a particular political commu-
nity."70 The other, the "desirable activity" model, in which "the extent and
quality of one's citizenship is a function of one's participation in that
community."7 1
The citizenship construct includes three elements or components:
civil (rights), political (participation) and social (welfare, security, cul-
ture). 72 Early citizenship literature tended to fuse these three compo-
nents. Today, citizenship is an idea that resonates and has both local and
global impacts. 73
69. See M. Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, Immigration, Poverty, and Transnationalism:
The Changing Terms of Citizenship in a Global Economy, in MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITI-
CAL ANTHOLOGY 337, 349 (Berta E. Herndndez-Truyol ed., 2002) [hereinafter
MORAL IMPERIALISM] (commenting that globalization is "reconfiguring notions of
citizenship"); Saskia Sassen, Economic Globalization and the Redrawing of Citizenship, in
MORAL IMPERIALISM, supra, at 135 (stating conditions of global economy have
"blurr[ed] the edges of the institution of citizenship").
70. See Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent
Work on Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352, 353 (1994).
71. Id. The authors note the danger of a "'theory of citizenship' that focuses
on the identity and conduct of individual citizens, including their responsibilities,
loyalties, and roles .... [The danger] arises because there are two different con-
cepts which are sometimes conflated in these discussions .... " Id.
72. See T.H. MARSHALL, CLASS, CITIZENSHIP, AND SoCIAL DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS
By T.H. MARSHALL 78 (Univ. of Chi. Press, 1977) (1964) (dividing citizenship into
three parts).
73. See Kim Rubenstein, Citizenship in a Borderless World, in LEGAL VISIONS OF
THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY 183
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A classic conception of citizenship that shows the conflation of both
models identifies citizenship as groups of persons with shared descent, lan-
guage, culture and/or traditions.7 4 Indeed, many believe that "democracy
... requires a large measure of social and cultural homogeneity to func-
tion."7 5 In this regard, "[c]itizenship ... becomes less an entitlement than
a definition . . . [for] [p]eople [who] want to know where they belong,
and they want to belong to familiar and homogeneous groups."76
Essential in the formulation of a globalized citizenship model is the
confrontation of the failure of the legal, social, political and economic
versions of citizenship for subordinated and marginalized groups. As one
commentator has suggested, for persons at the margins, citizenship "may
not make much difference to one's life" as neither the "legal status" nor
the "desirable activity" concepts of citizenship has enabled such persons to
attain desired social justice and equality.7 7 This failure of the current con-
cepts of citizenship can be explained in a two-fold manner. First, because
citizenship is narrowly viewed as solely a political category, it fails to ad-
dress its attendant, but separate, social and economic inequities. 78 Sec-
ond, a model of citizenship that focuses on the complex of civil and
political rights embraced in the French and American Declarations is
more likely to be grounded on characteristics and interests of the domi-
nant elites-the political and economic ruling classes-around the
world.79 Thus, it reinforces class stratification, as well as ethnic, racial and
gender differences. 80
(Anthony Anghie & Garry Sturgess eds., 1998) ("Citizenship is a legal, political,
and social construct which has domestic and international consequences."); see also
Kim Rubenstein, Citizenship in Australia: Unscrambling Its Meaning, 20 MELB. U. L.
REv. 503, 527 (1995) (analyzing meaning of citizenship in Australia and noting it is
"not a singular concept").
74. See Jirgen Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity, in THE CONDITION
OF CITIZENSHIP 20, 22 (Bart van Steenbergen ed., 1994) (discussing Roman usage
of term "nation" for "communities of people of the same descent").
75. Paul Hirst & David Held, Globalisation: The Argument of Our Time, OPEN
DEMOCRACY, Jan. 22, 2002, § 8, at http://www.globalenvision.org/library/8/528/6
(observing " [m] odern democracy developed in sovereign territorial states that had
made a huge effort to homogenise their populations, to create national languages,
common traditions and shared institutions").
76. Ralf Dahrendorf, The Changing Quality of Citizenship, in THE CONDITION OF
CITIZENSHIP, supra note 74, at 10, 16.
77. See ANN PHILLIPS, DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE 77 (1993) (commenting on
possible indifference to citizenship). "One disadvantaged group after another
fought lengthy battles to be included on the list [of citizens], only to find that
social justice and equality still eluded them." Id.
78. See id. at 77-78 (discussing citizenship as "fundamentally a political
category").
79. See HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 24-26 (providing United States Bill of
Rights in full); id. at 25-27 (providing France's Declaration of the Rights of Man
and the Citizen in full).
80. See Phillips, supra note 77, at 78 (noting implications of class inequalities).
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Thus, contrary to the homogeneous conception of citizenship is the
view that "[t] he true test of the strength of citizenship is heterogeneity
[because] common respect for basic entitlements among people who are
different in origin, culture and creed proves that combination of identity
and variety which lies at the heart of civil and civilized society."8 1 Far from
the early liberal understanding of citizenship as limited to political activity,
which some critics presently view as translating simply into the right to
pursue individual economic interests in the market,8 2 contemporary citi-
zenship theories have a broad, flexible sense of participation in public
life-a relational dimension. Indeed, since Marshall's conception of "the
ideal of citizenship as full participation in the community," the relational
aspect of citizenship has shifted from an individual vis-A-vis state model to
an individual vis-A-vis society model.8 3 As theories of citizenship evolved,
they underwent "a double process of fusion and separation. The fusion
was geographical, the separation functional."8 4 Ostensibly following this
model, many contemporary theorists insist that the concept of citizenship
must embrace differences among persons-differences of race, sex, sexu-
ality, ethnicity and religion, to name a few-and that a new conception of
citizenship must be developed because as "originally defined by and for
white men, [it] cannot accommodate the special needs of minority
groups." 85 This latter idea is coherent both with the reconstitution of the
81. Dahrendorf, supra note 76, at 17.
82. See Mary G. Dietz, Context Is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship, DAEDA-
LUS, Fall, 1, 5 (1987). Dietz explains:
What citizenship comes to mean in this liberal guise is something like
equal membership in an economic and social sphere, more or less regu-
lated by government and more or less dedicated to the assumption that
the 'market maketh man'. . . . [U]nder liberalism, citizenship becomes
less a collective, political activity than an individual, economic activity-
the right to pursue one's interests, without hindrance, in the market-
place.
Id. at 5; The Condition of Citizenship: An Introduction, in THE CONDITION OF CITIZEN-
SHIP, supra note 74, at 1-2 [hereinafter Introduction to Condition] ("[T] he concept of
citizenship seems to integrate the demands of justice and community member-
ship .... Citizenship is intimately linked with ideas of individual entitlement on
the one hand and of attachment to a particular community on the other.").
83. See Introduction to Condition, supra note 82, at 1-2 (noting Marshall's defini-
tion of ideal of citizenship and discussing shift in focus of citizenship from state to
individual).
84. MARSHALL, supra note 72, at 79.
85. Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 70, at 370 (citing Iris M. Young, Polity and
Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 258
(1989)) (developing notion of "differentiated citizenship" pursuant to which group
members would belong to and participate in communities based not only on their
individual status but also as group members). See generally Iris M. Young, Polity and
Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, in THEORIZING CITIZEN-
SHIP 175 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1995) (analyzing ideal of universal citizenship). Iron-
ically, the following notion has been presented:
[C]itizenship often propels us towards an ideal of transcendence, a
greater collectivity in which we get beyond our local identities and con-
cerns. When we are called upon to act as citizens, we are by implication
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human rights system proposed above and with the globalized citizenship
idea proffered in this work.
To be sure, the notion of globalized citizenship that I will develop
here is not without context, the idea has been discussed broadly in recent
times and has given rise to complex and nuanced conversations. For ex-
ample, Richard Falk, a prominent author in globalization and global gov-
ernance discourses, has indicated the tension between the corporate-
driven exercise of power by the financial elite: governments and markets/
investors-globalization from above-and the grassroots response of citi-
zens who focus on individual needs and react to the corporate/elite grab
of power, money, and resources-globalization from below. Falk has de-
veloped the idea of a "citizen pilgrim" who is part of the globalization
from below movement who works to resist the structures and conditions
imposed by the powerful. 86 This "citizen pilgrim" strikes a balance be-
tween the spiritual and the material worlds; s/he focuses on equality and is
not a fan of global governance. 87 This "citizen pilgrim" yearns to protect
the world for today's inhabitants as well as for later generations, but does
not view the state as the entity that can affect this goal; instead, the aspira-
tions can be achieved only by collective action "from below."
In a similar vein, David Held, a renown theorist of globalization, ex-
plains humans' "interconnectedness and vulnerability" across the globe-
and beyond national boundaries-as existing "overlapping communities
of fate." 88 Like the "citizen pilgrim," this community cannot rely solely on
the state, as it both surpasses and transgresses it, for justice. This commu-
nity reflects a shift from the state to a complex of actors that includes
national, subnational, supranational, international and regional locations
of activity. 89 The community also reflects the political diversity of groups
from both the developed and developing worlds, who nonetheless are con-
cerned about particular issues such as the environment and the deleteri-
not acting simply as women or men, black or white, manual worker or
professional, home-owner or council tenant ....
Phillips, supra note 77, at 81.
86. See Richard Falk, An Emergent Matrix of Citizenship: Complex, Uneven, and
Fluid, in GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 15, 27 (Nigel Dower &
John Williams eds., 2002) [hereinafter GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP] (presenting metaphor
of "citizen pilgrim").
87. See id. (describing how "citizen pilgrim rejects premises of materialism
and believes that a sustainable community can only result from a combination of
secular and spiritual energies").
88. See David Held, Violence and Justice in a Global Age, OPEN DEMOCRACY, Sept.
14, 2001, at http://www.opendemocracy.net/articles/ViewPopUpArticle.jsp?id=2
&articleld=144 [hereinafter Held, Violence and Justice] (arguing that because "the
fate and fortunes of each of us are thoroughly intertwined," terrorism must be
criminalized). See generally David Held, What Hope for the Future?: Learning the Les-
sons of the Past, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 381 (2002) (describing impact of
globalization on international law and justice).
89. See Hirst & Held, supra note 75, § 2 (contending "[a] reconfiguration of
political power is taking place as significant as the changes in the underlying world
economy").
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ous impact of economic globalization, capitalism, and neoliberalism. 90
This community insists that "unchecked economic power, exploding asym-
metries of life chances, weak democratic governments, the self-interest of
politicians and the threatened takeover of the public domain by the priori-
ties of big corporations-all violate our most elementary sense of social
justice and democracy."9 1 Networks of social, economic and political rela-
tions around the world, which seek to further justice and democracy-a
globalization from below-comprise the communities that search for jus-
tice. In order to succeed in attaining justice "[a] bridge has to be built
here between international economic law and human rights law, between
commercial law and environmental law, between state sovereignty and
transnational law."9 2
Globalization has affected the global expansion of "markets for
goods, services and finance [and] altered the political terrain."93 It is
identified with the "expansion of markets, neoliberal deregulation and the
abdication of politics."94 As such, it has created this overlapping commu-
nity of fate with "growing aspirations for international law and justice" of
which the United Nations, the European Union and the human rights
system are prime examples. 95 "The principles of freedom, democracy and
justice are the basis for articulating and entrenching the equal liberty of
all human beings, wherever they were born or brought up."96
Given that persons already are members of various communities-
social, economic, political-to achieve global democracy, the notions of
justice have to be extended beyond territorial borders.
Democracy for the new millennium must allow citizens to gain
access to, and render accountable, the social, economic and po-
litical processes which cut across and transform their traditional
community boundaries in the larger world. The core of this pro-
ject involves re-conceiving legitimate political activity in a man-
ner which disconnects it from its traditional anchor in fixed
borders and territories and, instead, articulates it as an attribute
of basic democratic arrangements in diverse associations-from
cities and sub-national regions, to nation-states, regions and
global networks. The cosmopolitan project, as [Held] call[s] it,
90. See id. § 3 (noting reasons for unease of world-wide globalization protest
movement).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 5 (setting out program for international collaboration).
93. Held, Violence and Justice, supra note 88, at 1.
94. Id.
95. See id. (naming other examples of growing aspirations for international
law and justice to include: changes to law of war, entrenchment of human fights,
emergence of international environmental regimes and International Criminal
Court); Hirst & Held, supra note 75, § 8 (positing that international law should be
balanced to economic globalization).
96. Held, Violence and Justice, supra note 88, at 2.
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is in favour of a radical extension of this process as part of a com-
mitment to a far-reaching cluster of democratic rights and
duties.9
7
In short, in order to protect the communities of fate, it is necessary to have
an international democratic polity.
It is not surprising then that both Falk and Held support the creation
of global structures for the pursuit of the well-being of the "citizen pil-
grim," of the community. Falk has proposed the creation of a "Global
Peoples Assembly" that permits an "ideological dynamic of empowerment"
for popular sovereignty, but threatens the notion of state autonomy.
98
Held, on the other hand, more generally calls for the "build[ing of] new
political capacities, regionally, like the [European Union], and also glob-
ally."99 He signals the importance of creating or bettering:
new kinds of effective public assemblies at regional and global
levels, to complement those at local and national levels .... The
creation of new global governance structures with responsibility
for addressing global poverty, welfare and related issues are vital,
to offset the power and influence of the predominantly market-
oriented agencies such as even a reformed [International Mone-
tary Fund] and [World Trade Organization].100
In short, he wants a cosmopolitan democracy that places the "public do-
main" in the hands of the public itself.10 1 He maintains "that the narrative
of expertise and top-down government has run its course."
10 2
Kwami Anthony Appiah invokes the idea of "citizens of the world.
10 3
Unlike other citizenship ideas, this vision focuses on individual responsi-
bility. Recognizing that world citizens can find themselves anywhere on
the globe, their obligation is to leave "that place better than we found
it."' 104 Such "cosmopolitian [ism] also celebrates the fact that there are dif-
ferent local ways of being human, while humanism is consistent with the
97. Hirst & Held, supra note 75, § 7 (offering "cosmopolitan democracy" as
solution to democratic legitimacy in globalized world).
98. See Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assem-
bly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191, 216
(2000) (commenting that assembly representing "people of the world" can create
binding transnational law).
99. Hirst & Held, supra note 75, § 8 (noting that "the project of managing
globalisation by strengthening the democratic basis of states, while important, is
insufficient").
100. Id.
101. See id. (noting modern states' propensity to homogenize through cul-
ture, language and traditions).
102. Id.
103. Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, in FOR THE LOVE OF COUN-
TRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 21 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996).
104. Id.
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desire for global homogeneity." 10 5 In sum, while we may all be different,
we are all equally human and thus deserving of respect, dignity and well-
being.
These ideas of citizen pilgrim, communities of fate and world citizens,
which emphasize emancipation and growth for individuals, contrast with
other conceptions of global citizenship that effectively signify and identify
with the forces of capitalism, neoliberalism and the market.1 0 6 One exam-
ple is the burgeoning field of social corporate responsibility that is gener-
ated by the elite corporate power to soften and enliven their image.
10 7
Such global citizens are economic actors who have acquired rights solely
because of their economic power, much like states have power because of
their economic and military might. Under the guise of concern with eco-
nomic rights, global corporate citizens instead use their economic power
to exploit workers and even host states. 10 8 As economic globalization in-
creases, the need to make these corporate "citizens" accountable to the
people increases. 10 9 This conception of a global corporate citizen lies in
stark contrast to the vision proffered in this piece.
The proposed globalized citizenship model also exists in contraindi-
cation to the liberal idea(l) of citizenship that embraces the notion that
human beings are "atomistic, rational agents whose existence and interests
are ontologically prior to society." 110 Rather, globalized citizenship is rela-
tional and promotes equality and pluralistic participation in all facets of
civil existence. It deconstructs "the fiction of effective individual agency,"
which, in reinforcing the status quo, simply fortifies and bolsters the loca-
tion of the powerful in social, political and economic circles and veils the
disempowerment of the marginalized. 111
The globalized citizenship construct addresses not only social, eco-
nomic and political inequalities, but also accounts for varied cultural con-
105. Id. at 25.
106. See Claire M. Dickerson, The Recognition of the Individual: A Human Rights
Perspective for International Commerce, in MORAL IMPERIALISM, supra note 69, at 151
(discussing how norm of indifference facilitates human rights abuses).
107. See id. (discussing impact of supranational organizations and multina-
tional enterprises on commercial and labor activity of repressed states); Sassen,
supra note 69, at 135 (arguing economic globalization directly affects formation of
rights associated with citizenship).
108. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW,
GLOBALIZATION AND EMANCIPATION 62-63 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing affect of social
and political conditions on pragmatic transition); see also Fernandez-Kelly, supra
note 69, at 338 (noting lack of opportunity among minority groups despite in-
creased strength of globalized economy); Sassen, supra note 69, at 139-40 (discuss-
ing effect of global market on states' social and economic policies).
109. See Caspar Henderson & George Monbiot, Governing Globalisation, OPEN
DEMOCRACY, Nov. 29, 2001, at http://www.opendemocracy.net/articles/
ViewPopUpArticle.jsp?id=6&articleld=269.
110. Dietz, supra note 82, at 2 (citations omitted).
111. See MARIA LUGONES, PILGRIMATES/PEREGRINAJES 210 (2003) (discussing
fiction of individual agency).
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cerns and circumstances within which real people live their real existence.
In this regard, the emancipatory potential of globalized citizenship lies not
just in its embrace of individual rights, but also of culture, community and
society. Unlike the liberal view of citizenship, globalized citizenship is not
about individuals as isolated from social or political conditions, but rather
as part of them-about humans' relational spaces. As such, a globaliza-
tion from below model of globalized citizenship requires new ways of
thinking about civil society. The either local or global dichotomy needs
instead to become a third way in which we think and act globally-both
locally and globally-so that interests and rights movements can connect
across and within local and global lines.
Just as the un-reconstituted human rights model reflects Western val-
ues,' 12 the popular market notion of globalization, which is effecting gross
economic disparities and thus affecting the enjoyment of full citizenship
rights, is one that reinforces and confirms the Western liberal preference
for markets over state lines.11 3 Ironically, this preference for deterritorial-
ization of activity and denationalization of identity supports the erasure of
the national borders constitutive of traditional claims of citizenship-a
foundational concept that supports the connections engendered by the
globalized citizenship idea. An erasure of territorial borderlands by mar-
ket globalization creates a tension with the liberal view of the citizen as
atomistic, individualistic and wedded to those transcended territorial bor-
ders. 114 Indeed, the deterritorialization of states effected by the globaliza-
tion of markets, along with the impairment of sovereignty effected by
human rights norms, effectively has blurred the notion of citizenship as a
condition of membership specific to the nation-state and enabled the
112. See Berta E. Herndndez-Truyol, Human Rights, Globalization, and Culture:
Centering Personhood in International Narrative, in MORAL IMPERIALISM, supra note 69,
at 359 (noting realm of human rights is only place where marginalized citizens can
gain both "visibility and protections"); Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol & Sharon Rush,
Culture, Nationhood, and the Human Rights Ideal, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 817, 821
(2000) (arguing "complicity in silence promotes hegemony").
113. See RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE 50-51 (1999)
(arguing dynamics of globalization subordinating states role to global markets);
Introduction: Why Citizenship Constitutes a Theoretical Problem in the Last Decade of the
Twentieth Century, in THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP, supra note 85, at 1, 20 n.2 [hereinaf-
ter Introduction to Wh -y Citizenship] ("[T]he Western liberal commitment to the pri-
macy of universal markets over national borders necessarily undermines the claims
of citizenship in the formation of economic policy."); RAJAGOPAL, supra note 20
(noting relationship between resistance in international law and state); Sassen,
supra note 69, at 141 (questioning whether power of global capital markets is
threat to democratic electoral system and political accountability); Held, Violence
and Justice, supra note 88, at 1.
114. See Introduction to Why Citizenship, supra note 113, at 20 n.2 (discussing
modern developments relating to break down between national identity and citi-
zenship); see also Dietz, supra note 82, at 2 ("[T]here is the notion that human
beings are atomistic, rational agents whose existence and interests are ontologi-
cally prior to society.").
[Vol. 50: p. 10091030
GLOBALIZED CITIZENSHIP
crafting of the globalized citizenship idea as a human counterbalance to
economic market forces.
Powerful economic actors have a newfound claim in and control of
the means of production and the flow of capital, formerly the province of
state sovereigns.1 15 First-world states have developed internal third- worlds
consisting of inner cities, new under-classes, racial and ethnic minorities,
politically disenfranchised and economically marginalized persons. Third-
world states are increasingly dependent on the exportation of labor to the
first-world or importation of industry into its territory-in both cases sub-
jecting its peoples to substandard wages and exploitative working
conditions."l 6
Significantly, the first-world's opening and broadening of financial
markets and industry in the third-world effect a cultural and economic
"exim" (export/import) process in which the values and desires of the
powerful North and West (mostly the United States) are implanted on the
South and East. Such market expansion has an impact on individual lives
and on human capabilities. If the economic globalization discourse
adopted a critical perspective, existing narratives would be broadened to
include stories beyond those about mass capital transfers. A critical chron-
icle would also expose the effects of social globalization-such as the
transmigrations of customs, languages and religious and cultural practices
that follow the flow of persons who follow the flow of money; the widening
gap between the rich and poor and the erosion of cultures and families.'
1 7
The more persons, culture and capital travel and become diffused
and no longer bound to territorial borderlands, membership in more
than one community-even more than one political community-be-
comes inevitable. The migrations and relocalizations of members of na-
tional, ethnic, religious, sexual, racial and gender groups outside of clearly
defined national territorial borders will result in international and trans-
national communities that exist without respect to nation-state bounda-
ries, resulting in changing concepts and boundaries of accountability.
Thus, social globalization, particularly the aspect of movement of persons
across myriad borders, facilitates the formation of multiple alliances and
perhaps broad political interconnections. As citizenship becomes an in-
creasingly deterritorialized concept, its nexus to and communion with a
nation-state will continue to erode.
As Boaventura de Sousa Santos says in reply to the question "who
needs Cosmopolitanism? . . . Whoever is a victim of intolerance and dis-
crimination needs tolerance, whoever is denied basic human dignity needs
a community of human beings; whoever is a not-citizen needs world citi-
115. See Sassen, supra note 69, at 137-38 (discussing power and influence of
private investors on social norms and citizenship).
116. See Ferndndez-Kelly, supra note 69.




zenship in any given community or nation."1 18 A globalized citizenship
model that emerges from a critical intervention into the human rights
model shifts the concept of citizenship from a state-based model to a
deterritorialized rights-, interests- and identity-based one. Such a con-
struct provides a remedy to the moral flaw of sovereignty that allows a state
to disregard its disempowered and marginalized citizens as well as to the
myopic disingenuity of economic market globalization that is eroding
equality and justice around the world and benefiting only corporate, offi-
cial and even state elites. Thus, globalized citizenship can form part of a
subaltern cosmopolitan legality that opens the door to emancipation by
creating aspiration- and rights-based bonds, and thus collectives of inter-
est, unbound by territorial lines or limitations.
Notions and forces of the new model of globalized citizenship are not
synunymous with westernization, with the privileging of elites from the pe-
ripheral spaces, with the visible portions of global market economies or
singularly with economic growth. Rather, the new globalized citizenship
model embraces and incorporates the international human rights idea of
personhood and dignity. Globalized citizenship is a paradigm based on
attributes of human beings qua human beings, recognizing that the fulfill-
ment of personhood is indivisibly connected to the enjoyment of civil, po-
litical, social, economic and cultural rights of individuals; peace; and a
healthy environment, as well as to individuals' participation in civil society.
In short, globalized citizenship constitutes the proverbial bundle of sticks
that belongs to persons because they are human beings.
This idea is both a construct and a methodology. It allows the evalua-
tion of the tension between the weakening of the state and correlative
erosion of sovereignty effected by the small-government-seeking, free-mar-
ket-promoting, neoliberal policies effected by globalization on the one
hand, and the need for a strong efficient state that can promote and pro-
tect human rights, including antipoverty measures, employment, educa-
tion, justice and the rule of law as a primary responsibility of government
on the other hand. Globalized citizenship provides the basis for a recon-
ceptualization of policies, instruments and structures of international
trade, investment and finance, as well as security, from the bottom up.
The analytical framework centers the needs of the people.
To be sure, that the emergence of a global community has eroded
sovereignty is beyond peradventure. One prime example is the develop-
ment of international criminal responsibility. While the concept of indi-
vidual accountability was first seen in the Nuremberg Tribunal, it recently
reemerged with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
118. See id. at 19.
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slavia' 1 9 (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 120
(ICTR) and culminated with the International Criminal Court1 21 (ICC).
It is also reflected in the unacceptability of unilateralism, plainly seen in
the virtually universal condemnation of President Bush's Military Commis-
sion as a means to bring justice to the September 11 terrorists. 122
Globalized citizenship is complementary to Westphalian citizen-
ship. 123 It is part of a counter-hegemonic project that protects persons
where the Westphalian state fails.1 24 It is a citizenship pendent to our
humanity that embraces an ethic of care12 5 collectivity and commonality
while recognizing and embracing our differences rather than an ethic of
competition, adversity and conflict-concepts involved in both their ac-
tual and metaphoric significations.
In sum, globalized citizenship constitutes a politics of resistance to
oppression and subordination. It uses the human rights structure to in-
strumentalize the state or civil society on behalf of social responsibility,
eradication of poverty, education and sustainability. It organizes periph-
eral actors, regardless of geographic location, along coherent lines of
rights, identities and interests across as well as within borders. The human
rights structure enables and facilitates mobilization along these coherent
lines.
119. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
827 (1993), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/306/
28/IMG/N9330628.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter ICTY] (establishing "Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" due to "widespread and fla-
grant violations of international humanitarian law occurring within territory of
former Yugoslavia").
120. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
955 (1994), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/140/
97/PDF/N9514097.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter ICTR] (establishing tribunal
to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanita-
rian law committed in territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for
such violations committed in territory of neighboring states).
121. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/9 (1998) (entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://www.
un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome-statute (e).pdf [hereinafter ICC] (establish-
ing court as permanent institution with power to exercise jurisdiction over persons
for most serious crimes of international concern in complement to national crimi-
nal jurisdictions).
122. See generally Jordan Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Ille-
gality, 23 MIcH.J. INT'L L. 1 (2001) (arguing President Bush's actions after Septem-
ber 11 attacks raise serious human rights questions).
123. See Falk, supra note 86, at 23 ("Regional citizenship is both competitive
with and complementary to Westphalian citizenship. It is competitive in the fun-
damental sense of challenging the unitary and primary ideal of citizenship associ-
ated with the juridical/political construct of the nation-state, the backbone of the
modern system of world order.").
124. See id. (stating regional citizenship allows for greater individual participa-
tion without "subordination to a dominant territorial nationalism").
125. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); Kimberly Hutchings,
Feminism and Global Citizenship, in GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 86, at 53, 58.
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As such, globalized citizenship makes possible human development
and human flourishing, as well as participation and consent. It promotes
real democracy by facilitating people's voices in cogent contexts. A global-
ized citizenship paradigm embraces human rights as indivisible and ina-
lienable. It promotes justice by insisting on a pluralistic rule of law that is
knowable and obeyable by all, that is transparent and in which there is
true and ultimate accountability.
Globalized citizenship does for people what economic globalization
did for corporate interests. It provides a deterritorialized location of em-
powerment and solidarity. Rather than free market and neoliberalism,
human rights are its foundational policy. It provides a structure-a consti-
tutive base-for the global civil society that seeks equality and justice.
Globalized citizenship also demands that the state reenter the global con-
versations about resources, rights and people. These conversations have
recently been monopolized by elite corporate actors and have excluded
state actors. But like global governance,1 26 globalized citizenship rejects a
state-centric concept of world politics and of citizenship, focusing instead
on the international human rights ideal. These movements are by neces-
sity "glocal"-both global and local-as they will often be based on local
need shared throughout the globe. 127
A globalized citizenship model centrally maps human rights, delimits
sovereignty, redefines legitimacy of states under the rule of law and the
concept of territoriality and revalorizes humanity irrespective of borders
or boundaries. Such globalized citizenship marks the expansion of an in-
ternational civil society. Although at present it may be a contested space,
it represents a space where subaltern communities-within and without
national borderlands-can gain visibility and protections as members of a
newly constituted polity. The needs of individuals and groups who find
themselves in the midst of a new world geography will not be defined ex-
clusively within nation-state borders. As members of our own countries, of
our varied communities and also of a transnational citizenry--workers, wo-
men, native/first peoples, ethnic, racial and sexual minorities, children,
and subaltern groups-we can draw on international alliances to better
their conditions, to ensure participation and to assure that a democratic
principle of citizenship takes into account the varied cultural environ-
ments and circumstances in which people exist.
This global citizenship model can come to life by analyzing concrete
examples of marginalization, oppression, subordination and disempower-
126. See generally Introduction, in GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION: POWER, AUTHOR-
IT AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 9 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2002)
[hereinafter GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION] (discussing basic tenets of "global gov-
ernance" theory).
127. See David Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideas, Realities and Deficits, in GOVERNING
GLOBALIZATION, supra note 126, at 305 (listing factors such as extensity, intensity
and speed of trade as primary forces behind globalization of market economy af-
fecting local communities).
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ment. As has been suggested, globalization can take the traditional route
of the hegemonic first-world state exporting products and values, but it
can also take form with the subaltern moving in and sharing the spaces
formerly occupied by the hegemon.
V. THE GUANTANAMO CASE
The case of the prisoners in Guantdnamo Bay's Camps X-Ray and
Delta provides a vivid and disheartening example of how the rights of the
powerless can be compromised by those in power. It also provides an op-
portunity to examine how the embrace of a globalized citizenship model
that is deterritorialized, relational and identity-based can be of utility in
engaging the problematic nature of unequal power relations. In Guantd-
namo Bay, the captives have entered into an asymmetric encounter with a
dominant national culture-the United States, possessor of massive hege-
monic power both domestically and internationally, locally and globally.
To be sure, the events of September 11, 2001 had a transformative
effect on life and society in the United States and the world. 128 On that
day, nineteen men, whose presence within U.S. territorial borders ranged
from the illegal to the mysterious, armed themselves with box-cutters and
hijacked four civilian aircraft. These men strategically turned the four
planes into "human-controlled jet-fueled missiles of mass destruction" by
flying two into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City
and one into the Pentagon, outside of Washington, D.C.129 Although the
hijacking of a fourth plane was successful, passengers thwarted the hijack-
ers' efforts to use it as a weapon for mass destruction. These brave passen-
gers made the plane crash in a field in Pennsylvania without taking
casualties beyond the persons aboard.
The perpetrators were not state actors. Rather, they were members of
Al Qaeda, a group that apparently worked with the Taliban, a rebel group
that controlled about eighty percent of Afghanistan but was not recog-
nized as its government by the global community except for Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan. These Al Qaeda criminals, some
of whom trained as pilots in U.S. flight schools, were immediately and uni-
versally labeled as terrorists for their heinous acts.
An estimated 6,333 people were immediately missing and, eventually,
almost 3,000 were declared dead, including foreign citizens from sixty-five
countries. With these occurrences, the United States, the sole surviving
superpower in the twenty-first century, was transmogrified from a safe state
to a besieged one-from a state where security and even invulnerability
were presumed to one permeated by fright, incertitude and anxiety. The
United States, promptly joined by the global community, labeled the
events of September 11 as an act of war. This designation elides Al
128. Berta E. Hernmndez-Truyol & Christy Gleason, Introduction, in MoRAL Im-




Qaeda's criminal acts with (possibly legally justifiable) acts of war-an eli-
sion that may carry legally problematic consequences as will be discussed
below.
Global response to the attacks was fast and virtually uniformly ex-
pressed as solidarity with and support for the United States. For example,
NATO invoked Article 5 of its founding treaty, a mutual defense clause
stating that an armed attack against any of the allied nations in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against all of them. 1 30 The
day after the attack, many governments of the world expressed both
shared aims with the United States and against terrorism. Thus, the Bush
Administration began an effort to form a coalition against terrorism. This
endeavor received overwhelming support, including the support from
such surprising sources as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Egypt and
Kazakhstan. Moreover, states that had recognized the Taliban as Afghani-
stan's legitimate government quickly severed their ties, thus ending recog-
nition. By the end of September, 2001, even the Chinese government,
who was originally seriously concerned about sovereignty issues, expressed
strong support for the U.S. war on terrorism, and even for limited military
strikes. Such cooperation, however, did not come without a price. For
example, in order to obtain Russia's support, the United States ceased its
open condemnation of Russia's massive human rights violations in
Chechnya, including its armed incursions into territory that sought to be
independent, ostensibly subordinating human rights to security needs pos-
sibly in violation of the Article 4 of the ICCPR.
13 1
On September 18, 2001, the Bush Administration advised ajoint ses-
sion of Congress that Al Qaeda was responsible for the attacks. On Octo-
ber 7, 2001 the war against terrorism took a significant turn when U.S.
130. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34
U.N.T.S. 243, 246; see also Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of
Greece and Turkey, Oct. 22, 1951, available at http://www.hri.org/docs/NATO/
grturk.html (discussing territorial changes under NATO). While the political con-
sensus is important, the NATO alliance has little to offer the United States milita-
rily. Specifically, Article 5 provides as follows:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all,
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence
recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, includ-
ing the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall
immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary
to restore and maintain international peace and security.
Id.
131. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 4. For further discussion, see supra notes 24-
25 and accompanying text.
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military forces launched Operation Enduring Freedom. This operation
consisted of U.S.-led air strikes with British participation in Kabul, Afghan-
istan, which targeted forces associated with Al Qaeda or with the Taliban
leadership under Mullah Muhammad Omar.
Yet, while the popular narrative is that September 11 transfigured life
as we knew it in the United States, the reaction to those events reflects
historical patterns of targeting "others." Both the domestic and interna-
tional responses by the United States are of questionable legality, but
nonetheless are being pursued and imposed because the United States has
the power to do so. For example, the domestic legal response to these
heinous acts has been, and continues to be, to unconstitutionally target
immigrants based on their sex, national, racial, religious, ethnic and even
political identities-specifically Muslim men of Middle Eastern descent,1 3 2
designations that also are patently illegal under international law. Even if
this war against terror could legitimately be considered a war, and it cer-
tainly can be considered a state of public emergency, such targeting is in
breach of the standards of derogation. As the ICCPR makes clear, rights
cannot be derogated from "solely on the grounds of race, colour, sex, lan-
guage, religion or social origin."133
On January 11, 2002, the United States transferred the first group of
captives from Afghanistan to the U.S. naval base in Guantdnamo Bay,
Cuba. The Pentagon described the complex evaluation process used to
ascertain which captives are sent to Guantdnamo Bay. First, U.S.-led coali-
tion soldiers, based on available information of direct combat, detain
those posing a threat to the United States and coalition forces. Next, cap-
132. See, e.g., Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334 (Sept. 20, 2001)
(amending 8 C.F.R. 287-3(d)) (interim rule providing that noncitizens can be de-
tained for 48 hours without charge and, in "emergenc[ies] or other extraordinary
circumstance . . . [for] an additional reasonable period of time"); see also Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Justice (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(granting Attorney General unprecedented powers, including ability to detain
noncitizens upon "reasonable grounds" to believe "that they are involved in activity
that endangers national security" and to deport or refuse entry to persons who
"endorse or espouse terrorist activity," who persuade others to support terrorist
activity or terrorist organization, or raise money for terrorist group); Monitoring of
Communications with Attorneys to Deter Acts of Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. §§ 500, 501
(2001) (interim rule allowing prison authorities to monitor communications be-
tween inmates and their counsel in instances in which Attorney General certifies
there is "reasonable suspicion" inmate is using such communications to facilitate
acts of violence or terrorism); Registration and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmi-
grants, 67 Fed. Reg. 52,584 (Aug. 12, 2002); Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant
Aliens from Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 67,766 (Nov. 6, 2002) (regulations
requiring noncitizen young men from Arab and Muslim nations to register with
government, and requiring men from twenty-two nations-Afghanistan, Algeria,
Armenia, Bahrain, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Korea,
Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab
Emirates and Yemen-over age of sixteen to be interviewed, photographed and
fingerprinted).
133. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 4(l).
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tured individuals are sent to a central holding area, where a military
screening team reviews available information, including interviews with de-
tainees. The military screening team assesses whether the detainee should
continue in detention, or be transferred to GuantAnamo Bay. A general
officer then makes a third assessment of enemy combatants who are rec-
ommended for transfer, including assessing "the threat posed by the de-
tainee, his seniority within hostile forces, and possible intelligence that
may be gained from detainee through questioning .... 134 Once that
determination is made, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) officials re-
view the proposed transfer. An internal review panel passes the informa-
tion and evaluates the propriety of the transfer. Upon the detainee's
arrival at Guantsnamo Bay, there is a "very detailed and elaborate process
for gauging the threat posed by each detainee to determine whether, not-
withstanding his status as an enemy combatant, he can be released or
transferred to the custody of a foreign government consistent with [U.S.]
security interests."1 35 Each case is reviewed by a team and assessed accord-
ing to the threat posed to U.S. national security interests. Information
revealed during questioning is constantly reviewed and analyzed to assess
reliability. The U.S. Southern Commander, or his/her designee, makes a
recommendation on each case based on the threat posed. The recom-
mendations are sent to the Pentagon, where a panel of experts collects
information and makes recommendations on release, transfer to foreign
government or continued detention. These recommendations are sent to
an interagency expert group composed of members of the DOD, Depart-
ment of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Department of
Homeland Security and the National Security Staff. Once there, each ex-
pert votes on the recommendation and the entire package is sent to the
Secretary of Defense or his/her designee for review. The decision then
finally is made as to release, transfer or continued detention. 13 6
Despite this process, the images are troubling. Pictures of the trans-
ferred Taliban-A1 Qaeda captives in shackles, either hooded or wearing
black-out goggles, in prison jumpsuits and sometimes brought to their
knees, generated protests from around the world and from within the
United States. Over two years later, the prisoners, at least three of whom
were minors, remain in chain-link cages and are allowed only twenty min-
utes of activity three times a week. They are limited in their communica-
tion with each other and the outside world. Such treatment, either viewed
separately or collectively, conceivably constitutes violations of interna-
tional law.
134. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF DEF., Briefing on Detainee Operations at Guantd-
namo Bay (Feb. 13, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/
2004/tr20040213-0443.html (discussing procedures for detaining enemy combat-
ants at Guant~namo Bay prison).
135. Id.
136. See id. (discussing U.S. protocol for detaining enemy combatants).
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Notwithstanding these conditions, the United States insists that the
captives are well cared for and have their physical and spiritual needs met.
Despite these official assertions and even allowing for the necessary ac-
commodation of religious practice, some reports suggest that prisoners
are forced to stand, hooded, with arms raised and chained to the ceiling,
their feet shackled, unable to move for long periods and sometimes na-
ked. 1 37 Over six hundred persons from forty-two states currently held in
Guantdnamo Bay are approaching their second anniversary in captivity,
without any trial. 138 Many have been found to have no ties to terrorism,
Al Qaeda or the Taliban.
A global source of contention was President Bush's unilateral an-
nouncement on the status of the prisoners. Ignoring established proce-
dure, President Bush declared that the third Geneva Convention13 9 would
apply to the Taliban, but not to the Al Qaeda detainees. 140 The President
declared that neither group would be granted prisoner of war status.
14 1
Instead, he unilaterally has labeled the captured as unlawful combatants-
a term unknown in international law-lacking protected status in interna-
tional law. He has kept the prisoners incarcerated in Guantinamo Bay, all
the while denying them the procedural and substantive rights to which
they are ostensibly entitled under international law pursuant to the Ge-
neva Conventions and other human rights instruments. Having made
these unilateral designations, the United States has failed to hold hearings
to determine the legal status of the detainees as required by the third Ge-
neva Convention. 142 It is precisely because of possible ambiguities con-
137. See Carlotta Gall, U.S. Military Investigating Death of Afghan in Custody, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at A14 (giving former prisoners' accounts of treatment at
Guantdnamo Bay prison).
138. SeeJamie Fellner, Double Standards: Prisoners of War in Iraq and at Guantd-
namo, Mar. 31, 2003, I'rr'L HERALD TaiB., available at http://www.iht.com/articles/
2003/03/31/edfellnered3-.php (stating statistics for GuantAnamo Bay
prisoners).
139. See Convention III, supra note 32.
140. See Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, the Legal Adviser, United
States Dep't of State, to Counsel to the President (Feb. 2, 2002) [hereinafter Taft
Memo] (noting that "[t]he President should know that a decision that the Conven-
tions do apply is consistent with the plain language of the Conventions and the
unvaried practice of the United States in introducing its forces into conflict over
fifty years" and providing that "[f] rom a policy standpoint, a decision that the Con-
ventions apply provides the best legal basis for treating the al Qaeda and Taliban
detainees in the way we intend to treat them").
141. The prisoner of war status would require certain treatment under the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, and also would impede trial in the military tribunals
set up by President Bush. One obstacle to designating these captives "prisoners of
war" is that this status requires the captive to have been acting on behalf of a state,
while the captives, as well as the actors in the September 11 attacks, were acting on
behalf of Al Qaeda, which is not a state or a state representative. See Taft Memo,
supra note 140.
142. Convention III, supra note 32 (requiring that countries hold hearings to
determine status of detainees during war).
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cerning the status of a person captured during armed conflict that Article
5 of the third Geneva Convention specifically provides that:
[s]hould any doubt arise as to whether persons, having commit-
ted a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the en-
emy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4,
such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Conven-
tion until such time as their status has been determined by a
competent tribunal. 14
3
Holding persons in GuantAnamo Bay without clarification of their status as
required by the Geneva Conventions, and without any reasoned explana-
tion, weakens international humanitarian law. 144
The United States, no longer very credibly after the Abu Ghraib
photos, 14 5 promises to treat captives humanely as it flouts accepted inter-
national norms and ignores the global demands for the captives to be
treated according to the Geneva Conventions, which are binding not only
under conventional law but also as customary norms. While disregarding
the law, the United States also unilaterally claims the power of the law-
seemingly becoming the sole arbiter of which accepted norms it will follow
and which it will discount. The United States has asserted that it is enti-
tled to hold the detainees without trial, even after acquittal, until the end
143. Id. art. V.
144. See Heinz Klug, The Rule of Law, War, or Terror, 2003 Wisc. L. REv. 365,
373-74 (2003) (criticizing U.S. detention of enemy combatants after September 11
attacks as "recasting of humanitarian and civil rights law").
145. See Curt Anderson, Abuse Claims Spur Justice to Reurite Legal Advice in the
Shadow of Abu Ghraib: The Department Reconsiders Its Counsel on the Interrogation of
Prisoners, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 24, 2004, at A3 (reporting U.S. Dep't ofJustice
will review and revise several key 2002 documents, especially Bybee Memo, infra
note 192); Nancy Benac, The Pictures Are Worth 1,000 Winces-Images of Abuse in Abu
Ghraib Revolt Americans the Way No Words Can, STAR-LEDGER (Newark N.J.), May 7,
2004, at 19 (detailing prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison); Christopher Cooper,
Cases of 33 Are Indication That Abu Ghraib Abuse Wasn't Isolated Situation, WALL ST. J.,
May 24, 2004, at A3 (referring to deaths of 33 detainees captured in Iraq and
Afghanistan, including nine homicides); Excerpts from Prison Inquiry: 'Sadistic, Bla-
tant and Wanton Criminal Abuses' Reported at Abu Ghraib, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2004, at
A8 (describing excerpts from "U.S. Army investigative report on alleged abuses at
U.S. military prisons in Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca, Iraq"); Michael A. Fuoco &
Cindi Lash, Prisoner Abuse No Secret to Many at Abu Ghraib: Documents Show Soldiers,
Civilians Had Knowledge of Mistreatment, POST-GAZETtE (Pittsburgh, Pa.), May 27,
2004, at Al (noting Army Criminal Investigation Division documents that "appear
to support [charges] that military intelligence officers directed the [MPs at Abu
Ghraib] to 'soften up' detainees prior to interrogations"); Craig Gordon, The
Probes at Abu Ghraib Prison, NEWSDAY, May 5, 2004, at A3 (noting "U.S. abuses wider
than thought; Pentagon admits 25 Iraqis have died in custody"); Douglas Jehl, July
Inspection: Red Cross Noted Abuses at 2nd Site, CHIc. TRIB., May 15, 2004, at 8 (noting
"U.S.-run detention center outside Baghdad known as Camp Cropper was report-
edly the site of numerous abuses of Iraqi prisoners several months before the mis-
treatment unfolded.. . at Abu Ghraib prison"); The File: Prison Abuse, S.F. CHRON.,
June 20, 2004, at Al 7 (noting various investigations and reporting deaths of thirty-
two Iraqi and five Afghani prisoners).
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of the war against terrorism-the international standard applicable to en-
emy combatants captured during the course of a war.
Some already have questioned the legality-both procedural and sub-
stantive- -of the Guantnamo Bay detentions. For example, the United
Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions concluded that the U.S.
failure to have an international body ascertain the captives' status and
grant them a fair trial, as provided for under the third Geneva Conven-
tion, signified that the captive's detention was arbitrary. 146 The Working
Group also noted that even if a competent tribunal invalidated prisoner-
of-war status for the detainees, the guarantees of the ICCPR, which would
automatically become effective, would be violated. 147
It is noteworthy that the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR), an organ of the Organization of American States of
which the United States is a member, requested by letter dated March 12,
2002 that the United States "take the urgent measures necessary to have
the legal status of the detainees at Guantinamo Bay determined by a com-
petent Tribunal."148 The United States responded by claiming that "the
legal status of the detainees is clear, that the IACHR does not have juris-
dictional competence to apply international humanitarian law, that the
precautionary measures are neither necessary nor appropriate in this case,
and that the Commission lacks authority to request precautionary mea-
sures of the United States." 14 9 In reply, the IACHR reasserted its authority
to request precautionary measures citing Article 5 of the third Geneva
Convention 150 and Article XVIII of the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man. 15 1 The IACHR claimed the right of:
146. See United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions, Civil and
Political Rights, Including the Question of Torture and Detention (Dec. 16, 2002), U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2003/8 (citing Convention III, supra note 32, art. 5 (2)) (concluding
Guantdnamo Bay detainees' captivity "arbitrary" based on U.S. refusal to follow
provisions of Geneva Convention).
147. See id. (contending even if prisoner-of-war status were dropped, United
States would still be in violation of international law).
148. Letter from Juan Mendez, President, Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (LACHR), to Center for Constitutional Rights (CRC) (Mar. 13,
2002), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/excep/unnamed4.html.
149. Letter from United States to IACHR, Response of U.S. to Request for
Precautionary Measures-Detainees in GuantAnamo Bay, Cuba (Apr. 11, 2002),
available at http://www.asil.org/ilib/ilib0508.htm#r2.
150. Convention III, supra note 32, art. V. Article V stated in pertinent part:
The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4
from the time they fall into the power of the enemy and until their final
release and repatriation. Should any doubt arise as to whether persons,
having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of
the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such
time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
Id.
151. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, at Art. XVIII,
available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic2.htm (last visited June 28,
2005) ("Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his legal rights.
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human rights supervisory bodies such as this Commission [to]
raise doubts concerning the status of persons detained in the
course of an armed conflict, as it has in the present matter, and
require that such a status be clarified to the extent that such clari-
fication is essential to determine whether their human rights are
being respected. In light of the principle of efficacy, it is not
sufficient for a detaining power to simply assert its view as to the
status of a detainee to the exclusion of any proper or effectual
procedure for verifying that status. 152
Until recently, legal challenges to the U.S. Guantdinamo Bay deten-
tions have been unsuccessful. In Rasul v. Bush,153 two British, one Austra-
lian and twelve Kuwaiti nationals who were captured in Afghanistan
challenged their Guant.namo Bay detentions in United States federal dis-
trict court.1 54 The District Court dismissed the detainees' petition for
habeas corpus, ruling that foreigners held by the United States outside of
its sovereign territory could not seek habeas relief in U.S. courts because
U.S. courts lack jurisdiction in foreign territories. Commentators have al-
ready shown the incoherence of denying jurisdiction in territory that is
clearly under U.S. control.1 5 5 Moreover, using the Nuremberg Tribunal's
recognition ofjurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce based on
legal occupation, the U.S. ostensibly legal (although contested) occupa-
tion of Guantdnamo Bay should suffice for the federal courts to exercise
their jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to persons detained there. 156
Some answers as to the legitimacy of the U.S. Guantdnamo Bay deten-
tions are now available, although short on detail. The United States Su-
preme Court heard the cases of Rasul v. Bush15 7 and Al Odah v. United
There should likewise be available to him a simple, brief procedure whereby the
courts will protect him from acts of authority that, to his prejudice, violate any
fundamental constitutional rights.").
152. Letter from Ariel Dulitzky, In Charge of the Executive Secretariat,
IACHR, to CRC (July 23, 2002), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/ex-
cep/unnamed2.html.
153. 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (deciding petition for writ of habeas
corpus by aliens detained at U.S. Naval Base in GuantAnamo Bay), revd 124 S.Ct.
2686 (2004).
154. See id. at 57-58 (deciding Rasul together with Al Odah v. United States, No.
02-828 (D.D.C. filed May 1, 2002), rev'd sub nom. Rasul v. United States, 124 S.Ct.
2686 (2004), action brought separately by twelve Kuwaiti detainees and their fam-
ily members).
155. See Paust, supra note 122, at 27-28 (criticizing inconsistencies limiting
prosecution within jurisdiction of federal courts).
156. See Diane M. Amann, Guantdnamo, 42 COL. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 263
(2004) (concluding that "U.S. courts have jurisdiction to scrutinize extraterritorial
detention, and that the doctrine of deference ought to yield to judicial duty to
protect individual rights").
157. 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004).
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States,'5 8 specifically asking "whether the habeas statute confers a right to
judicial review of the legality of Executive detention of aliens in a territory
over which the United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction,
but not 'ultimate sovereignty. ' 1 59 Distinguishing precedent, the Court
decided that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutional
and statutory legality of the continued U.S. detention of persons in Guan-
tdnamo Bay. 1
60
Significantly, because the legacy of Nuremberg confirms that what a
state does on its own soil to its own citizens matters, it is only apt that the
U.S. Supreme Court also decided the cases of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 6 1 and
Rumsfeld v. Padilla.162 Hamdi concerned a U.S. citizen captured on the
battlefield in Afghanistan, labeled an enemy combatant and detained in
Navy brigs first in Norfolk, Virginia and later in Charleston, South Caro-
lina.' 6 3 Padilla concerned the so-called "dirty bomber," a U.S. citizen ar-
rested in Chicago after returning from a trip to Pakistan, on the allegation
that he planned to detonate a dirty bomb in the United States. 164 Padilla
was designated an enemy combatant and held at a Navy brig in Charles-
ton, South Carolina. 165
In Hamdi, the Court asked "whether the Executive has the authority
to detain citizens who qualify as 'enemy combatants.'"166 In its holding,
the Court concluded "that although Congress authorized the detention of
combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged here, due process de-
mands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be
given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that deten-
tion before a neutral decisionmaker." 167 The Court rejected the govern-
ment's contention that the enemy combatant status 'justifie[d] holding
158. 541 U.S. 933 (2004) (granting certiorari; case decided with Rasul, 124
S.Ct. 2686).
159. Rasul, 124 S.Ct. at 2693 (citations omitted); see also Amann, supra note
156, at 347-48 (discussing issue in case).
160. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693-95 (distinguishing case and noting
"[p]etitioners in these cases differ from Eisentrager detainees in important re-
spects"); id. at 2698-99 (holding "[section] 2241 confers on the District Courtjuris-
diction" to hear habeas challenges to Guantdnamo detentions and that there is no
bar under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2002) (Federal Question Statute) or 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2002) (Alien Tort Statute) because they "implicate the 'same category of laws
listed in the habeas corpus statute'") (citation omitted).
161. 124 S.Ct. 2633 (2004).
162. 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2716 (2004) (deciding both procedural and substantive
issues surrounding petitioner's challenge of detention as enemy combatant).
163. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635-36 (reviewing factual findings of detainee's
status).
164. See Face-Off" The Supreme Court and White House Are Facing a Showdown Over
Enemy Combatants, NEWSDAY, Jan. 13, 2004, at A26 (discussing upcoming enemy
combatant case of "dirty bomber").
165. See Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2715-16 (recounting relevant facts leading to
petitioner's detention).
166. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639 (addressing threshold question in case).
167. Id. at 2635 (reviewing holding of court).
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him in the United States indefinitely-without formal charges or proceed-
ings." 168 The Court formally noted that "[Ji]t is during our most challeng-
ing and uncertain moments that our Nation's commitment to due process
is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our
commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad."
1 69
Thus, a citizen being held as an "enemy combatant must receive notice of
the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."'
170
In Padilla, the Court only reached the question of whether petitioner
had filed for habeas in the appropriate district.171 Because it concluded
that he had not, the Court did not reach the issue of whether the Presi-
dent had authority to detain him indefinitely. 172 In his dissent, Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, would have found
jurisdiction. The dissent noted that "this case is singular not only because
168. Id. at 2636. The case came about when Hamdi's father filed a habeas
petition on Hamdi's behalf, challenging the government's detention "without ac-
cess to legal counsel or notice of any charges pending against him." Id. (citation
omitted). The District Court concluded that if Hamdi was an enemy combatant,
the government's detention was lawful. See id. (discussing lower court's rationale
for detention). The sole support for his detention was a declaration by someone
described as a Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. See id.
at 2636-37 (discussing facts leading to lower court's conclusion). While the District
Court found this to be insufficient and ordered production of documents, the
Fourth Circuit reversed this decision on appeal, thereby upholding the legal
grounds for detention. See id. at 2637-38 (discussing facts leading up to Supreme
Court grant of certiorari). The Court recognized, however, that detention may last
no longer than active hostilities are ongoing. See id. at 2641 (stating rationale for
upholding detention). Yet, it acknowledged that even when detention is legally
authorized "there remains the question of what process is constitutionally due to a
citizen who disputes his enemy-combatant status." Id. at 2643; see also id. at 2638
(noting existing debate regarding meaning of term "enemy combatant").
169. Id. at 2648 (highlighting historical context of case).
170. Id. The Court went on to add that while notice and right to be heard
constitute fights, "the exigencies of the circumstances may demand that, aside
from these core elements, enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to allevi-
ate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing mili-
tary conflict." Id. at 2649. The Court emphasized the importance of the
separation of powers, but declined to accept the government's rationale that such
powers permit "a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances."
Id. at 2650-51. Nevertheless, the Court noted that the standards for due process
may be satisfied by a military tribunal. See id. at 2651-52 (noting adequate stan-
dards of criminal process afforded enemy combatants).
171. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715 (2004) (reviewing whether
Padilla properly filed habeas petition in Southern District of New York).
172. See id. (failing to reach substantive issue in case on procedural grounds).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court for the
Southern District of New York's holding that it had jurisdiction over Secretary
Rumsfeld and that the President lacked authority to detain Padilla militarily. See
id. at 2717 (discussing facts of case). The Court recognized that because Com-
mander Marr had custody of Padilla and the District Court did not have jurisdic-
tion over her, the District Court lacked jurisdiction. See id. at 2719-20 (noting key
facts leading to Court's decision).
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it calls into question decisions made by the Secretary himself, but also be-
cause those decisions have created a unique and unprecedented threat to
the freedom of every American citizen."17 Considering the Secretary a
proper custodian for habeas purposes, the dissent found that the peti-
tioner properly filed for relief in the Southern District of New York.
17 4
The dissenting justices acknowledged that reasonable jurists might differ
on whether Padilla is entitled to immediate release; however, they recog-
nized that there is "only one possible answer to the question whether he is
entitled to a hearing on the justification for his detention. 1 75 The dissent
compellingly observed:
At stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a free
society. Even more important than the method of selecting the
people's rulers and their successors is the character of the con-
straints imposed on the Executive by the rule of law. Uncon-
strained Executive detention for the purpose of investigating and
preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star Cham-
ber. Access to counsel for the purpose of protecting the citizen
from official mistakes and mistreatment is the hallmark of due
process. 17
6
In response to the Rasul decision, on July 7, 2004, the DOD issued an
order establishing a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) to provide
the Guantd.namo Bay detainees with notice of the grounds for their deten-
tion and an opportunity to contest their status as enemy combatants. 177
173. Id. at 2732-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing uniqueness of attack
on federal criminal convictions).
174. See id. at 2733-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting proper forum is not
matter of federal subject-matter jurisdiction).
175. Id. at 2735 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (analyzing whether respondent is en-
titled to immediate release).
176. Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
177. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Defense Department Background Brief-
ing on the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.
dod.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040707-0981.html. The Combatant Status Review
Tribunal (CSRT) is a "streamlined" and "expedited" process where detainees are
notified of the opportunity to challenge their enemy combatant designation, con-
sult with a non-lawyer military official who will serve as a personal representative in
the proceedings, and be advised of the Supreme Court's decision that they are
entitled to review of their detention in U.S. courts within ten days of the issuance
of the order creating the tribunal. See id. (discussing procedures for enemy com-
batants). The tribunal itself is comprised of three neutral military officers who
have not had prior involvement with the detainee. See id. (discussing procedures
under CSRT). The government affords the detainee an interpreter to help with
communications with the personal representative and an opportunity to present
both documentary and testimonial evidence, depending on reasonable availability
of witnesses. See id. (same). The detainee, however, cannot be compelled to testify
against himself, but the government's evidence is given a rebuttable presumption
of validity. See id. (same). The tribunal decides "whether a preponderance of the
evidence supports the detention of the individual as an enemy combatant." Id. If
the tribunal decides that the enemy combatant status is not warranted, "[t)he sec-
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To be sure, the Court ruled that federal courts had jurisdiction to hear
challenges of the Guant-namo Bay detentions; however, the DOD, relying
on Justice O'Connor's statements in Hamdi that the fairly informal military
tribunal processes established under Army Regulation 190-8 may suffice to
satisfy due process requirements,1 78 established the CSRT with similarly
lax standards.
All of these decisions can be viewed as confirming the rule of law's
separation of powers, and thus a curb on unfettered Executive power uni-
laterally to deprive persons-citizens and noncitizens alike-of any sem-
blance of due process. Thus, it is encouraging that the Supreme Court
exercised oversight of the Executive in hearing these detention cases be-
cause it is plain that foreign courts feel they lack power to rule on these
matters even where their own citizens are concerned. For example, in
Britain, the family of a British national, Feroz Ali Abbasi, who was captured
by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and was transported to Guantdnamo Bay,
initiated proceedings based on the claim that one of his fundamental
human rights, the right not to be arbitrarily detained, was being vio-
lated. 179 At the time of his hearing, Abbasi had been a captive in GuantA-
namo Bay for eight months without access to an attorney, court hearing or
any other form of tribunal. 180 Although the British court refused to de-
cide whether the United States, a foreign sovereign, was in breach of treaty
obligations or in breach of public international law, it concluded that "in
apparent contravention of fundamental principles recognized by both ju-
risdictions and by international law, Abbasi is at present arbitrarily de-
tained in a 'legal black-hole." ' 18 ' Interestingly, since that decision,
President Bush, in behind-the-scenes conversations with his British and
Australian partners in Operation Iraqi Freedom, has apparently agreed
that neither British nor Australian citizens incarcerated in Guantdnamo
Bay will be subject to imposition of the death penalty.182
Similarly dissatisfied with U.S. processes are Swedish authorities who
have expressed to the United States their belief that Mehdi Ghezali, the
only Swedish prisoner held in Guant,-namo Bay, had no involvement with
retary of Defense will advise the Secretary of State, who will coordinate the transfer
of the detainee for release to the detainee's country of citizenship as appropriate."
Id.
178. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635, 2651-52 (2004) (recogniz-
ing required standards may be met by "appropriately authorized and properly con-
stituted military tribunal."). For a discussion of the Court's factual analysis, see
supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
179. See Abbasi v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 2002
EWCA 1598 (discussing facts of case).
180. See id. (same).
181. See id. 1 64 (noting court's predicament in deciding Abassi's fate).
182. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Bowing to Ally, Bush to Rethink Tribunals for British
Subjects, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2003, at A3; Associated Press, Bush Says Six Prisoners
May Face Tribunal, CBSNEWS.coM (July 3, 2003), at http://www.cbsnews.com/sto-
ries/2003/07/18/attack/main563920.shtml.
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illegal behavior before his arrest. Notwithstanding the U.S. agreement
with Sweden regarding Ghezali's activity, it refuses to release him for fail-
ure to cooperate with authorities.
183
In a March 15, 2004 press release, the U.S. Department of Defense
(DOD) announced it had transferred twenty-three Afghani and three
Pakistani detainees from Guant~namo Bay for release. 184 A week earlier,
on March 9, 2004, the DOD had announced that it transferred five British
detainees from Guantdnamo Bay to the British government. 185 The Brit-
ish government had agreed to accept the transfer of the detainees and
take responsibility that they do not pose a threat to the security of the
United States or its allies. Currently, 119 detainees have been released
and 12 others transferred for continued detention (four to the Saudi Ara-
bian government, one to the Spanish government, seven to the Russian
government). As of March 15, 2004, there remain approximately 610 de-
tainees in Guantdnamo Bay.
1 86
The freed British detainees have charged that they suffered inhu-
mane treatment at the hands of their captors, including beatings and in-
terrogations at gunpoint and other degrading treatments. The detainees
claimed that after their capture they were taken to a detention center in
Kandahar where "they were forced to kneel bent forwards for hours with
their foreheads touching the ground."1 8 7 Moreover, they leveled claims of
guards kicking and punching detainees, and further alleged many captives
were suffocated as a result of having been forced into lorry containers.
Further, former detainees described instances of botched medical treat-
ment, psychological torture and unreasonable confinement, such as being
shackled for up to fifteen hours with the restraints cutting into their skin.
183. See Munir Ahmad & Tommy Grandell, Eleven Pakistanis Freed from Guantd-
namo Bay After Two Years of Imprisonment, THE GuAtrmiN, July 18, 2003 (discussing
U.S. refusal to release Swedish enemy combatant). For an account of how one
Iraqi national resident in Britain and one Jordanian national refugee found them-
selves in captivity in GuantAnamo Bay, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL UK, UK Govern-
ment Must Act Now on Behalf of Guantdnamo Detainees (July 11, 2003), at http://www.
amnesty.org.uk/deliver?document=14 723 (detailing account of four British re-
sidents arrested, questioned and threatened by United States and Gambia). While
two of the British nationals were released, the remaining two were taken to Guan-
tdinamo Bay by way of Afghanistan and Britain refuses to take responsibility for
them. See id. (discussing facts of British nationals detained in GuantAnamo Bay).
184. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Transfer of Afghani and Pakistani
Detainees Complete (Mar. 15, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/re-
leases/2004/nr20040315-0462.html [hereinafter DOD 2004 No. 180-04] (announc-
ing transfer and release).
185. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Transfer of British Detainees Complete
(Mar. 9, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/
nr20040309-0443.html (announcing transfer).
186. See DOD 2004 No. 180-04, supra note 184 (estimating number of detain-
ees remaining in Guantinamo Bay).
187. See ALJAZEERA.NET, U.S. Military "Tortured" Guantdnamo Brits (Mar. 14,
2004), at http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/28B34402-F7E9-4F97-BABB-
07A7535CBDB4.htm (recounting experience of detainees in GuantAnamo Bay).
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In addition, released detainees complained of the condition of deten-
tion-wire cages open to the elements in which the captives claimed that
they were exposed to "rats, snakes and scorpions. 1 88 They further alleged
that the diet provided consisted of "porridge and fruit," some of which was
out of date for up to ten years, which resulted in malnourishment. 18 9 Fi-
nally, they raised claims of "U.S. soldiers bringing in prostitutes and parad-
ing them naked in front of Muslim prisoners." 190 The Pentagon dismisses
the charges as "lies" and insists that all detainees are being, and will con-
tinue to be, treated humanely.1 9 1 These dismissals post-Abu Ghraib and
in light of the Gonzales memo on torture1 92 are not, on their face, fully
credible.
On November 13, 2001, President Bush, as Commander-in-Chief, is-
sued a Military Order (Order) that created Military Commissions to try
foreign nationals "for violations of the laws of war and other applicable
laws" related to acts of international terrorism.1 9 3 The Order applies to
acts that have "adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national
security, foreign policy, or economy."1 94 The Order imposes no time
limit, and it originally contemplated that "the principles of law and the
rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States district courts" would not apply.195
188. Id.
189. See id. (accusing U.S. military of psychologically and physically mistreat-
ing detainees).
190. See id. (detailing abusive activity of detainees).
191. See ALJAZEERA.NET, More Guantdnamo Detainees Freed (Mar. 16, 2004), at
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/58Dl 6EDA-EFB2-4118-AEDB-7869CDDF
A148.htm (defending against allegations of abuse by former detainees at GuantA-
namo Bay).
192. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Asst. Attorney General, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the Presi-
dent 44 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/na-
tion/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf [hereinafter Bybee Memo]
(regarding "Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C.§§ 2340-
2340A;" specifically outlines self-defense justification for interrogating detained en-
emy combatants, noting while "an enemy combatant in detention does not himself
present a threat of harm... [he] may be hurt in an interrogation because [he is]
part of the mechanism").
193. See 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 § 1(e) (2001) [hereinafter Military Commissions
Order] (establishing military tribunals for prosecution of foreign nationals). The
recent Hamdi decision may provide a glimpse into the analysis concerning the va-
lidity of the military commissions. Although the commissions are only for trying
foreign nationals, Justice O'Connor in Hamdi specifically observed that "[t]here
remains the possibility that the [due process] standards we have articulated could
be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal."
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2651 (2004). It seems fair to project that if
such military tribunal ensures due process to a citizen captured in Afghanistan, it
similarly will be deemed to ensure due process to foreign nationals.
194. Military Commissions Order, supra note 193, § 2(a) (1) (ii).
195. Id. § 1(f).
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One prominent commentator has noted that "[i]n its present form
and without appropriate congressional intervention, the Order will create
military commissions that involve unavoidable violations of international
law and raise serious constitutional challenges."' 9 6 The President's power
as Commander-in-Chief to set up such commissions is only applicable dur-
ing "war within a war zone or relevant occupied territory [here, Afghani-
stan] and apparently ends when peace is finalized."' 9 7 "However, outside
of the occupied territory [of Afghanistan] .... military commissions can
only be constituted in an actual war zone and can only prosecute war
crimes." 19 8 The Guant~namo Bay Naval Base in Cuba is neither a war
zone nor occupied territory.
The Order, which provides only for review by a military panel and
thereafter only by the President or Secretary of State, does not comport
with the right of review as articulated in the ICCPR that "[e]veryone con-
victed of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being
reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law."1 99 Rejecting criticism
from around the globe for noncompliance with international substantive
and procedural requirements, it is the position of the United States, that
"[t]he law of armed conflict makes no provision for judicial review of the
detention of enemy combatants who are detained during hostilities solely
to take them out of the fight."2 00
On a positive note, the criticisms have resulted in some changes to
the procedures as originally contemplated. In July 2003, an international
law scholar commented that the military tribunal process "take full ac-
count of modern standards of international humanitarian and human
rights law."20 1 This view, however, is not universally embraced; rather, it is
highly contested.
To be sure, the rules now require a unanimous verdict by a seven-
member panel for the death penalty, provide that a suspect is presumed
innocent, require guilt to be established by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, allow the accused to have military lawyers at government expense
or to hire their own civilian lawyers at their own expense and allow the
196. See Paust, supra note 122, at 2.
197. Id. at 5 (defining scope of President's military judgment).
198. Id. at 9 (stating military commissions' jurisdiction limited to war crimes
unless convened in occupied territory permitting other criminal prosecutions be-
cause of "a special competence conferred by the law of war").
199. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 14(5); see also Military Commissions Order,
supra note 193 (outlining procedures for military tribunals).
200. See Anthony Dworkin, Excerpts from Interview with Charles Allen, Deputy Gen-
eral Counsel for International Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, CRIMES Or WAR PRO-
JECT: ON THE NEWS (Dec. 16, 2002), available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/
onnews/news-pentagon-trans.html (defending military's actions at Guantdnamo
Bay).
201. Ruth Wedgwood, Justice Will Be Done at Guantdnamo, FIN. TIMES LIMITED,
July 10, 2003, at 19.
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press to cover most proceedings. 20 2 Nonetheless, questions still exist as to
the Military Commissions' conformance with international and domestic
substantive and procedural justice requirements. 20 3 For example, the ap-
plicable rules of evidence for military tribunals are less onerous than for
either civilian trials or military courts-martial, where strict rules apply.
Specifically, the Military Commissions allow evidence that "would have
probative value to a reasonable person," thereby applying a much weaker
standard. 204
Except for death penalty cases, a finding of guilt can be established by
the concurrence of two-thirds of the Military Commission panel, which is
comprised of "at least three but no more than seven members. '20 5 This
procedural standard follows the two-thirds vote requirement in noncapital
cases and unanimous vote requirement in courts-martial, but the composi-
tion of courts-martial for "serious offenses"-arguably a description of all
the offenses triable by the Military Commissions-require at least five mili-
tary members. On the other hand, the Military Commissions' require-
ments are weaker than those in civilian federal courts, in which the jury is
composed of twelve members of the community drawn at random and in
which a unanimous decision is required to convict in all cases, including
capital cases.
Other troubling aspects of the Military Commission trial structure
persist. For instance, Military Commission Order No. 3 allows the moni-
202. See Katharine Q. Seelye & Sherri Day, Rumsfeld Gives Details of Rules for
Military War Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, available at http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=33&did=223 (stating "the rules on intro-
ducing evidence [at the military tribunals are] looser than those in civilian courts,
with hearsay allowed, as well as any evidence that would be convincing to a 'reason-
able person"'); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Department of Defense Fact Sheet:
Military Commission Procedures (2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Aug2003/d2003O8l2factsheet.pdf (providing details of detainees rights).
203. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 2. Article 2 requires:
[e]ach State party ... undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individu-
als within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized
in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or so-
cial origin, property, birth, or other status.
Id.; see also id. art. 26 (providing "[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law"). "In this
respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth, or other status." Id.
204. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Military Commission Order No. 1: Proce-
dures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, § 6D(1) (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.defense-
link.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf [hereinafter DOD 2002 MCO No. 1];
see also Seelye & Day, supra note 202 (noting that rules on introducing evidence
were looser than those in civilian courts). For example, hearsay is allowed, as well
as evidence that would be convincing to a "reasonable person." Id.
205. DOD 2002 MCO No. 1, supra note 204, § 4A(2).
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toring of communications between detainees and their counsel "for secur-
ity or intelligence purposes," 20 6 although supposedly the information
could "not be used in proceedings against the individual who made or
received the relevant communication." 20 7 In some cases, captives and
their civilian lawyers may be denied access to evidence used in trial. Fur-
ther, counsel may also be required to reveal information learned from
clients concerning further criminal activity.
In addition, the reconfigured rules still do not provide any process for
independent appeals, continue to deny habeas review and keep the entire
process within the military.20 8 Following the panel's delivery of a verdict
and imposition of a sentence, the Appointing Authority conducts an ad-
ministrative review of the record and may return the case to the Military
Commission. 20 9 Thereafter, a three-member review panel of military of-
ficers, which may include civilians commissioned for such purposes, re-
views the record for "material error of law." If such error exists, the case is
sent to the Appointing Authority for further proceeding; if no material
error of law exists, the review panel forwards the case to the Secretary of
Defense with a recommendation as to disposition. In turn, the Secretary
of Defense reviews the trial record and the panel's recommendation and
either returns the case for further proceedings or, absent a presidential
designation granting the Secretary of Defense final decision-making pow-
ers, forwards the case to the President for his review and final decision.
The final decision-maker-either the President or the Secretary of De-
fense as his designee-"may approve or disapprove findings, or change a
finding of Guilty to a finding of Guilty to a lesser-included offense, or miti-
gate, commute, defer, or suspend the sentence imposed or any portion
thereof."210 It is significant to highlight that these Military Commission
procedures fail to provide the safeguards of appeals that are available in
courts-martial, which provide for an appeal to the Military Court of Crimi-
206. United States Dep't of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 3: Special
Administrative Measures for Certain Commission Subject to Monitoring, § 4A (Feb. 5,
2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/d2OO40206ord3.
pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (promulgating policy where certain communica-
tions may be subject to monitoring by special administrative measures).
207. Id. § 4F. (designating policy regarding use and disclosure of monitored
communications).
208. The recent Rasul decision, however, provided that U.S. courts have juris-
diction to hear habeas petitions, which effectively recognizes the right of persons
in custody in Guant.namo to have their conditions of detention reviewed. See
Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2692-99 (2004). In fact, the Court specifically noted
that the habeas "statute draws no distinction between Americans and aliens held in
federal custody." Id. at 2696.
209. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Military Commission Instruction No. 9:
Review of Military Commission Proceedings (Dec. 26, 2003), available at http://www.
defenselink.mil/news/Jan2004/d2004OlO8milcominstno9.pdf (stating procedure
for reviewing Military Commission proceedings).
210. DOD 2002 MCO No. 1, supra note 204, § 6H(6).
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nal Appeals or the Court of Appeals for Armed Forces and then possibly
the U.S. Supreme Court.2 11
With these rules in place, it appears that some captives will finally be
brought to trial by the Military Commissions. On July 7, 2004, the DOD
announced that the President determined that nine more enemy combat-
ants would be subject to his November 13, 2001 military order, bringing
the total to fifteen detainees eligible for trial by military tribunal. 2 12 On
July 3, 2003, six detainees were determined to be subject to the military
order. 213 Of the original six, charges were brought against only two of
them. 214
Unlike the limited definition of war crimes that existed at Nurem-
berg, the concept of crimes of war has expanded. The U.S. DOD Military
Commission Instruction No. 2, a document created in April, 2003 to pro-
vide guidance with regard to the offenses (and the elements thereof) for
which the detainees may be charged, lists eighteen offenses under a cate-
gory tiled "Substantive Offenses," which includes many of the crimes in-
cluded in the Tribunal Charter 2 15 as well as in the ICTY, 2 16 ICTR2 17 and
211. See Seelye & Day, supra note 202 (recognizing rules do not provide pro-
cess for independent appeals to keep control of tribunals in military chain of
command).
212. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Presidential Military Order Applied to
Nine More Combatants, News Release (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.dod.
mil/releases/2004/nr20040707-0987.html (citing Military Commissions Order, supra
note 193).
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Rights Groups Won't Get Seats at Guantdnamo Base
Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at A14 (observing President had designated
six of 650 prisoners at GuantAnamo Bay as eligible for trial); More Guantdnamo
Detainees Freed, supra note 191. For a complete discussion of the charges, see United
States v. Ali Hamza Ahmad Sulayman Al Bahlul, available at http://www.defense-
link.mil/news/Feb2004/d20040224AIBahlul.pdf (last visited June 28, 2005) (out-
lining charge of conspiracy against detainee), and United States v. Ibrahim Ahmed
Mahmoud Al Qosi, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/
d20040629AQCO.pdf (last visited June 28, 2005) (outlining charge of conspiracy
against detainee).
215. Tribunal Charter, supra note 26, art. 6.
216. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 36, available at http://dac-
cessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/248/35/IMG/
N9324835.pdPOpenElement (detailing offenses and procedures of ICTY); id. art.
2 (listing "[g]rave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949," including "(b)
torture or inhuman treatment . . . ; (c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health;... (f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of
the rights of fair and regular trial; (g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful
confinement of a civilian"); id. art. 3 (referring to violations of laws or customs of
war); id. art. 4 (referring to genocide); id. art. 5 (referring to crimes against hu-
manity, including "(e) imprisonment; (f) torture; ... (i) other inhumane acts").
217. ICTR, supra note 120, art. 2 (referring to genocide); id. art. 3 (referring
to crimes against humanity); id. art. 4 (referring to violations of the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 and of Protocol II, supra note 32, including:
a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in
particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or
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ICC 218 statutes. Specifically, Instruction No. 2 lists the following as war
crimes: willful killing of protected persons, attacking civilians, attacking
civilian objects, attacking protected property, pillaging, denying quarter,
taking hostages, employing poison or analogous weapons, using protected
persons as shields, using protected property as shields, torture, causing
serious injury, mutilation or maiming, use of treachery or perfidy, im-
proper use of flag of truce, improper use of protective emblems, degrad-
ing treatment of a dead body and rape. 21 9 Moreover, Instruction No. 2
lists eight additional substantive offenses which are triable by the military
commissions: highjacking or hazarding a vessel or aircraft, terrorism, mur-
der by an unprivileged belligerent, destruction of property by an un-
privileged, aiding the enemy, spying, perjury or false statement, and
obstruction ofjustice related to military commissions.2 20 Further, Instruc-
tion No. 2 lists seven offenses for which an individual may be held crimi-
nally liable, which include aiding and abetting, solicitation, command/
superior responsibility-perpetrating, command/superior responsibil-
ity-misprison, accessory after the fact, conspiracy and attempt.
22 1
Neither of the first-the only two-charged Guantnamo Bay detain-
ees is charged with genocide or crimes against humanity. Rather, their
charges are that they conspired and agreed to commit the following of-
fenses: attacking civilians and attacking civilian objects-actions not iden-
tified as war crimes, perhaps to avoid the necessity of having the Military
Commission decide on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions; mur-
der by an unprivileged belligerent; destruction of property by an un-
privileged belligerent; and terrorism.
222
Moreover, the detainees may claim prisoner-of-war (POW) status that
would entitle them to the protections of the Geneva Conventions. This is
important in light of trial by Military Commission because Article 102 of
the third Geneva Convention provides that POWs can only be sentenced
any form of corporal punishment; b) Collective punishments;... e) Out-
rages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
... h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts[)].
218. ICC, supra note 121, art. 5(1) (limiting jurisdiction "to the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole... : (a) The crime of
genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of
aggression").
219. See United States Dep't of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 2:
Crimes and Elements for Trials by Military Commission, § 6(B) (Apr. 30, 2003), available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2003/d2003O430milcominstno2.pdf
(enumerating offenses and elements thereof).
220. Id. § 12 (listing specific offenses and elements thereof).
221. Id. § 16 (providing examples of offenses and elements thereof).
222. See Frederic L. Kirgis, United States Charges and Proceedings Against Two
Guantdnamo Detainees for Conspiracy to Commit Crimes Associated with Armed Conflict,
AM. Soc'v OF INT'L L., March 2004, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/in-
sighl26.htm (arguing that charges against detainees do not allege violation of any
.specific statutory or treaty provisions and referring to Al Qosi and Al Bahlul, where
both defendants were charged with conspiracy).
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by the same courts and using the same procedures as would be the case for
members of the armed forces of the detaining authority, which in this case
is the United States. 223 Significantly, as explained above, the Military
Commissions for foreigners do not provide the same safeguards that
courts-martial would provide U.S. soldiers. POW designation is limited,
however, to members of militias and other corps in the service of a state
party to the conflict. Someone not in the service of a state party to the
conflict must be commanded by someone responsible for subordinates,
have distinctive signage, carry arms, and behave according to laws and cus-
toms of war. Al Qaeda members may not be able to qualify for such status
absent some connection to a state, which, in this instance, is likely to be
Afghanistan.
It is also noteworthy that on March 2, 2004, the Secretary of Defense
published a draft of "Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Com-
batants in the Custody of the Department of Defense at Guantnamo Bay
Naval Base, Cuba."2 24 These rules, it appears, are aimed at diffusing the
strong criticism against the United States for holding detainees indefi-
nitely without process. Establishing such rules reiterates the U.S. position
that "[t]he law of war permits the detention of enemy combatants until
the end of an armed conflict"2 25 -a period that could be an indetermi-
nate, if not interminable period, particularly in this context in which the
enemy is elusive and the "war on terror" defies state boundaries and state
actions. Lastly, the draft dictates that the process is wholly discretionary.
Accordingly, a review board is established:
[To] reassess the need to continue to detain an enemy combat-
ant at least annually during the course of hostilities. This process
will operate in a manner that permits each enemy combatant in
the custody of the Department of Defense at the GuantS.namo
Bay Naval Base to explain why he is no longer a threat to the
United States and its allies in the ongoing armed conflict against
al Qaida and its affiliates and supporters or to explain why it is
otherwise in the interest of the United States and its allies that he
be released.2 26
223. Convention III, supra note 32, art. 102. This article provides:
A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been
pronounced by the same courts according to the same procedure as in
the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, and if,
furthermore, the provisions of the present Chapter have been observed.
Id.
224. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Draft Memorandum: Administration Re-
view Procedures for Enemy Combatants in the Custody of the Department of Defense at Guan-
tdnamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, § 1 (2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Mar2004/d20040303ar.pdf (citing draft of administrative review procedures
for enemy combatants in custody of DOD at Guant~namo Bay).
225. Id.
226. Id. (outlining role of review board).
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VI. CONCLUSION: POWER, THE RULE OF LAW AND
GLOBALIZED CITIZENSHIP
In reviewing the September 11 attacks, and the ensuing war on terror,
in the context of human rights, some staggering similarities between the
(dismissed) objections to the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal
and its Charter by Germany, on the one hand, and to the U.S. post-9/ll
processes by the global community, on the other, emerge. The discussion
of these similarities is intended not to undermine Nuremberg's legacy, but
to acknowledge the elision of politics and law that took place and to sug-
gest that centering globalized citizenship in the analysis would be of great
utility to both individuals and the world community interested in its
emancipatory potential. At the outset, one important distinction is war-
ranted: sovereign power, whether exercised singularly or collectively, isjus-
tified to deliver security, safety, and a good life to people.
Notwithstanding the reality that Nuremberg represented the exercise of
power by the victors, that exercise was consistent with the underlying pur-
poses of sovereignty. Its aim was to unite persons against the horrible acts
that were committed and it served to strengthen international institutions.
The U.S. Guantfnamo Bay strategy, on the other hand, is polarizing and
divisive of international affairs and the proposed Guantdnamo Bay struc-
ture weakens international institutions of peace and justice. The U.S.-led
coalition, in pursuing a military response to 9/11, where the enemy is a
"globalized [terror] network rather than a territorial state, or even a politi-
cal movement associated with a struggle for control or secession affecting
a single state,"227 has elected not to prioritize the development of interna-
tional law and United Nations institutional arrangements and not to em-
phasize the importance, desirability and necessity of building bridges
between its global economic and political interests and goals of justice.228
In both the post-Second World War and the post-9/11 series of
events, a victor's justice was imposed on the captives. For Germany, there
was no precedent to piercing its sovereignty. With Al Qaeda and the
Taliban, there was no sovereignty to pierce. But the labeling of the post-
9/11 events as a war on terror has created a patina of official action and
has given nonstate actors a quasi-sovereign status-potentially with legal
consequences and legitimizing effects. 22 9
227. Richard Falk, Appraising the War Against Afghanistan, Social Science Re-
search Council/After September 11, available at http://www.ssrc.org/septll/es-
says/falk-textonly.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (describing new "enemy" in war
on terror).
228. See David Held, Return to the State of Nature, OPEN DEMOCRACY, Mar. 20,
2003, available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/articles/ViewPopUpArticle.jsp?
id=2&articleId=1065 (claiming U.S.-led war on Iraq was failure of American strat-
egy, diplomacy and thinking).
229. Significantly, recent decisions seem to apply the rules of conventional
war to the war on terror. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2004)
(discussing "established principle of the law of war that detention may last no
longer than active hostilities").
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In Nuremberg, the Tribunal Charter created and defined the crimes
after the fact. 230 The Court rationalized its judgment on these "new"
crimes as legitimate because it concluded that the crimes had previously
existed in some form. Similarly, the post-9/11 process has created a new
crime by redefining the concept of war. Just as in Nuremberg, there were
new crimes for which not only states, but also individuals would be held
accountable-now we have a concept of war in which private persons, not
state actors, can be responsible. As unlawful combatants, the captured are
indeed in a legal black hole with the rule of power creating a new status in
law.
The Military Order unilaterally decreed by President Bush is much
like the Tribunal Charter, unilaterally drafted by the Allied powers. The
Germans decried the Tribunal Charter-its law and process-claiming it
violated the rule of law;2 3 1 but as the defeated entity, it was without power
to ignore or fend off the imposed system ofjustice. In a perverse twist, the
global community, including the IACHR, a body charged with promoting
and monitoring human rights, today decries the U.S. failure to follow the
rule of law, but the United States possesses the power to ignore the norms
to which it has consented. In this context, it is encouraging that the sepa-
ration of powers and rule of law doctrines were resoundingly embraced by
the Supreme Court in its recent Rasul decision. With this Supreme Court
precedent as reinforcement, the globalized citizenship ideal, using both
procedural challenges and substantive identity corrections, provides inter-
national objectors a location in which to unite their voices and create a
network that seeks justice for the captives.
There is an ongoing concern that the trials will not be fair and that
the U.S. Military Commission alternative will fail to satisfy international
standards. The procedures crafted lack transparency and the exclusive
military-dominated nature of the process undermines the U.S. commit-
ment to civil liberties and the rule of law. In this regard, it is noteworthy
that Pentagon officials have announced that representatives of human
rights advocacy groups will not be able to witness the Military Commission
trials at GuantAnamo Bay, while more than eighty members of the U.S.
and foreign press, as well as representatives of the ICRC, will have seats. 232
Consideration whether to grant seats to human rights organizations went
beyond seating availability, including problems of security and limited
housing and food. Nonetheless, "there would probably be arrangements
for some members of Congress to attend the trials and perhaps for offi-
cials of organizations that represent victims of the Sept. 11 terrorist at-
230. Tribunal Charter, supra note 26.
231. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), supra note 3, at 216-22.
232. See Lewis, supra note 214 (discussing deliberations by military officials
regarding availability of seats in courtroom for possible military tribunals at Guan-
t.namo Bay).
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tacks." 2 33 This move works against those who would be inclined to use the
globalized citizenship model to insist on justice.
As a highly regarded human rights scholar has urged
We must respond to the September 11 tragedy in the spirit of the
laws: seeking justice, not vengeance; applying principle, not
merely power. We must respond according to the values embod-
ied in our domestic and international commitments to human
rights and the rule of law. If we are at war, that war will affect our
children's future, and that future-I submit-is far too impor-
tant for us, as lawyers, to leave to the politicians and the
generals.
234
The question ultimately becomes: how can the captives in Guant~namo
Bay benefit from a globalized citizenship model, grounded on human
rights principles that refocus the human rights discourse to include the
marginalized, the disempowered and the subaltern? A globalized citizen-
ship model would focus on the marginalized and the disempowered, and
would lead to more coherent and just results.
In the post-9/l1 world, centering the marginalized would take two
approaches. One, it would emphasize the ways in which the physical con-
ditions and unilaterally established legal processes are depriving the cap-
tives of their ability to claim or enjoy their human rights. In the case of
Afghan captives, it is especially critical as they effectively lack a govern-
ment that can present their claims. Two, it would coordinate the efforts of
others also marginalized, such as the global communities-states, nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs)-that condemn the United States' disregard of the rule of law.
Even if this were truly war, the United States cannot derogate from
certain rights. For example, the imposition of the death penalty would
deprive some of the Guant~namo Bay captives of their right to life, some
conditions of their captivity could be deemed torturous and the monitor-
ing of their communications with the family and counsel could be a viola-
tion of freedom of thought. A globalized citizenship model would draw
together persons inside and outside GuantAnamo Bay to clamor for the
observance of the rights we all share, but which those in Guant~namo Bay
are powerless to express.
The global citizenship idea can help with Guantinamo Bay because
its foundational principle is one of a deterritorialized, relational, identity-
based citizenship for individuals. That perspective allows for the forma-
tion of a global network of states, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that could unite to assist the
233. Id. (acknowledging military officials' trial conclusions for seating
arrangements).
234. Harold H. Koh, The Spifit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 23, 39 (2002)
(concluding human rights violations, whether committed by terrorists or allies, or
even government officials, must be addressed).
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captives in asserting their rights. The value of such a coalition is clear in
events that have already transpired with respect to some Guantdnamo Bay
captives. For example, both Britain and Australia have apparently secured
President Bush's agreement not to impose the death penalty in the mili-
tary tribunals of their nationals, thereby assuring their right to life.
Also, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) has brought the
Rasul case before the U.S. Supreme Court.235 Although this type of case is
not one that the CCR would typically litigate, the CCR clearly articulated
its reasoning for filing the suit. First, "[t]he center's role is to take risks,
legal and political risks, that other institutions are unwilling to take....
The Guantdnamo Bay case was a high risk." 236 Second, and perhaps of
more importance, "the detention case involved a policy that, if left un-
checked, . . . could undermine the core mission and traditional work of
the CCR itself."23
7
Human Rights Watch (HRW) has similarly served as a protector of
rights. Responding to the U.S. intent to engage in extreme measures
when interrogating some of the detainees, HRW called upon the Bush
Administration to "immediately explain who reviewed and approved a
high-level classified Pentagon memorandum that sought to justify the use
of torture."238 The HRW also has repeatedly called upon the United
States to make public the results of their investigations into allegations of
abuse in Afghanistan and into the deaths of three detainees-two Afghan
detainees who died while in U.S. custody in 2002 and another who died in
2003.239
235. See Center for Constitutional Rights, at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/home.
asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (providing history and details of non-profit legal
and educational organization dedicated to protecting and advancing rights guar-
anteed by U.S. Constitution and Universal Declaration).
236. Marcia Coyle, Taking the Risks, NAT'L L.J. ONLINE, Feb. 16, 2004, athttp:/
/www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1076428323925.
237. Id.; see also Nancy Chang & Alan Kabat, New Summary of Recent Court Rul-
ings on Terrorism-Related Matters Having Civil Liberties Implications, Feb. 4, 2004, at
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/report.asp?ObjID=N7yKoAObvc&Content=324
(reasoning why, despite fact that representing detainees marks clear break with
center's traditional representation, center chose to provide direct representation
in detainee cases).
238. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Bush Administration Lawyers Greenlight Torture:
Memo Suggests Intent to Commit War Crimes (June 7, 2004), available at http://hrw.
org/english/docs/2004/06/07/usdom8778.htm (criticizing President Bush's po-
tential order, which would provide for torture of detainees with legal impunity).
239. See HUMAN RiGHTS WATCH, U.S.: Systemic Abuse of Afghan Prisoners-Open
Files on Detainee Deaths (May 13, 2004), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/
2004/05/13/afghan8577_txt.htm (demanding information regarding mistreat-
ment of prisoners by U.S. military and intelligence personnel which resulted in the
deaths of 3 detainees); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, USA: Covering Events From
January 2002-December 2002 (2003), at http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/Usa-
summary-eng (expressing concern over U.S. treatment of detainees).
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GLOBALIZED CITIZENSHIP
Also noteworthy in the globalized citizenship paradigm are the efforts
of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) .240 Among its
many functions, the ICRC "regularly assess[es] the conditions of deten-
tion, the treatment of detainees and respect of their fundamental judicial
guarantees." 24 1 Thereafter, reports of their assessments are provided to
the state involved. As was learned from the Abu Ghraib situation, the
ICRC's knowledge is often greater than that of the general public, 242 al-
though obviously the responsibility to treat the detainees in accordance
with "international humanitarian law" standards remains solely the respon-
sibility of the United States. 243 In its Operational Update, dated May 14,
2004, the ICRC noted that it has visited detainees in Guantnamo Bay for
over two years and helped detainees relay messages to and from family
members-a service that is of significant importance to the mental well-
being of many of the detainees.2 44 The ICRC's knowledge base can pro-
vide incentives for a state to observe accepted norms and bring much
needed public attention to alleged violations.
To be sure, the response of organizations concerned with the treat-
ment of Guant~namo Bay detainees, particularly significant in light of the
recent allegations of abuse and torture of the prisoners held in Abu
Ghraib which has lent new credence to the claims of similar types of treat-
ment in Guant~namo Bay, has been swift. For example, in January of
2004, a new organization was created, GuantAnamo Human Rights Com-
mission (GHRC), the stated purpose of which is to "achieve an end to all
240. See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), at http://www.
icrc.org (last visited July 13, 2003). The Committee provides:
[The ICRC] works around the world on a strictly neutral and impartial
basis to protect and assist people affected by armed conflicts and internal
disturbances. It is a humanitarian organization.. . mandated by the inter-
national community to be the guardian of international humanitarian
law .... While the ICRC maintains a constant dialogue with States, it
insists at all times on its independence. Only if it is free to act indepen-
dently of any government or other authority can the ICRC serve the inter-
ests of victims of conflict, which lie at the heart of its humanitarian
mission.
Id.
241. Id. (outlining functions of ICRC).
242. See ICRC, Iraq: ICRC Explains Position Over Detention Report and Treatment of
Prisoners (May 8, 2004), at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/iwpList 74 /
7EE8626890D74F76C1 256E8D005D3861 (regarding publication by Wall Street Jour-
nal of excerpts from confidential ICRC report on detention in Iraq dated January,
2004 and submitted by ICRC to Coalition Forces in February, 2004); see alsoJehl,
supra note 145 (noting ICRC report of abuses at U.S.-run detention Camp Cropper
months before those reported at Abu Ghraib).
243. The responsibility is outlined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
244. See ICRC, Iraq: ICRC Continues to Provide Assistance to Victims of Violence,
(May 31, 2004), at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/html/626HBN?
OpenDocument (describing main activities carried out by ICRC staff in places of
detention by Coalition forces).
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forms of the internment without trial."245 In an effort to achieve its goal,
the organization, with the assistance of the American Civil Liberties
Union, the CCR and the National Council of Churches, has taken steps to
enable the families of European detainees to go to Washington. 246 In ad-
dition, GHRC has worked with the relatives of some detainees to petition
for the investigation of reports of torture and "demand the immediate
repatriation of the remaining four British citizens." 247
Thus, as global networks coalesce around issues ofjustice to demand
that internationally accepted processes be followed and that human rights
be recognized, individuals deprived of these rights will derive the benefits
of their global citizenship. For example, the IACHR demanded that their
process be followed, the CCR brought about the Rasul decision and the
ICRC used its access to the conditions in prison to create records. These
actions constitute the first steps in an application of the globalized citizen-
ship model that can result in the emancipation of Guantd.namo Bay cap-
tives who find themselves in an asymmetric encounter with a dominant
national culture.
A response to human rights violations, specifically the U.S. response
to the heinous acts of September 11, is not only irresponsible but simply
wrong if it serves to dehumanize others and to enable the commission of
other crimes. The investigation and punishment of human rights viola-
tions, such as those of Al Qaeda, should be in the hands of an interna-
tional coalition that will serve to bring the perpetrators tojustice and avoid
later crimes. It is true that during war, the courts that serve as the checks
on abuses of power of the political branches tend to defer to the political
branches on national security matters. It is this very reality, which militates
against allowing a process that is unfair or unjust, that suggests it is of
paramount importance to invoke an international, coalitional process.
To engage in warfare against sovereign states without a widely
accepted basis in law and necessity would be profoundly destruc-
tive of prospects for a peaceful and stable world. It would also
confirm the fears of many governments, including traditional
friends and allies, and of a large segment of world public opin-
ion, that our government acts on its own, that it has a militarist
approach to global security, and that its wider project is to
achieve global dominance. 248
245. See Guantdnamo Human Rights Commission, at http://www.
guantanamohrc.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (establishing organization to pro-
tect human rights of detainees in Guantdnamo Bay).
246. See id. (describing measures taken by Guantinamo Bay Rights Commis-
sion in conjunction with other organizations in implementing its plans to achieve
goals).
247. GHRC, Guantdnamo Families Deliver Petition Signed by over 3,000 to Baroness
Symons at Foreign Office, (June 16, 2004), at http://www.guantanamohrc.org/peti-
tion-pressrelease.html (petitioning release of British detainees).
248. Falk, supra note 227.
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GLOBALIZED CITIZENSHIP
As James Madison stated in The Federalist No. 51, " [i] n framing a gov-
ernment which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty
lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself."249 This Madisonian para-
dox of power holds that "organized power is necessary to protect the lib-
erty of citizens from the predations of their fellow citizens or others; but
organized power itself poses dangers to liberty."2 50
In their recent elections, Spanish citizens demonstrated that democ-
racy indeed works. The Spanish people opposed their leader's involve-
ment in what they viewed as an illegal and illegitimate war, tenuously and
disingenuously linked to 9/11, which exposed them to their own 3/11 Al
Qaeda terrorist attack. They used their collective individual power to
change the direction of their country's policies. They showed how global-
ized citizenship can work in a local setting. This example, if followed
across the globe, would have the salutary effect of the practice of global-
ized citizenship. The Spanish people's assertion of democracy as a tool of
liberation provides a moving example of how global discontent with the
war can unite citizens across the globe, opposed to the nebulous war on
terror while still condemning terrorism, to ensure that terrorism is fought
by means that respect and promote human rights.
Terrorist acts violate human rights, but the fight against terrorism
should not engender human rights violations or violations of the interna-
tional rule of law. Thus, the globalized citizenship idea could be of great
utility in Guant~namo Bay in both a programmatic and an instrumental
way. Programmatically, it would permit powerful countries to negotiate
on behalf of the persons being held based on shared concerns for the
rights violations that they are experiencing, whether based on religion,
race or political belief. The current situation limits those powerful coun-
tries to negotiate only for their citizens. For example, we have seen Brit-
ain's and Australia's successes in negotiating on behalf of their citizens-
both in regard to punishment to which their citizens may be subject and
concerning their release. Relations based on traits other than territorial
bonds could enable other captives to obtain guarantees of their right to
life and perhaps even liberty.
Instrumentally, it can be used to form coalitions against injustice. If
we are all global citizens, anyone seeking real justice for 9/11 (and 3/11),
including those within U.S. borders, can join together to advocate on be-
half of the persons being held in Guantdnamo Bay. One of the ongoing
249. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (referring to text entitled "The
Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Be-
tween the Different Departments").
250. Donald A. Downs & Erik Kinnunen, A Response to Anthony Lewis: Civil
Liberties in a New Kind of War, 2003 Wisc. L. REv. 385, 385-86 (2003) (citation omit-
ted) (criticizing Bush administration for disregard of international law, specifically
U.S. detention of "enemy combatants" indefinitely without charge, counsel or
meaningful review).
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themes that continues to resonate throughout this war is that if someone
questions anything that the administration says or does, then that person
is unpatriotic or, even worse, a traitor and a supporter of terrorists and
terrorism. That is simply not true; it is only inflammatory rhetoric by the
hegemon to instill fear and quash dissent. Rather than resort to such rhe-
torical tropes, a globalized citizenry can insist on free and open discourse,
conversations and actions that are central to a claim of justice.
The treatment of the Guant~namo Bay prisoners is a matter of inter-
national, local and human concern. All who strive for justice and equality
should demand adherence to the rule of law. Citizens around the world,
regardless of territorial allegiances, share their humanity. They can use
their voices locally, as the citizens of Spain did, in an impressive show of
democratic spirit to demand adherence to the rule of law. Global citizens
also can use their collective voices globally to demand similar
accountability.
Globalized citizenship also could be instrumental in counterbalanc-
ing the U.S. hegemonic control of right and wrong, good and evil. Global-
ized citizenship as an analytical model deconstructs the U.S. view of the
world as "you are either with us or you are against us"-a view that "exag-
gerates our goodness and our enemies' evil." 251 It challenges the U.S. at-
tempt "to recast the world in our image, 'propagating democracy' and
imposing our values and institutions on the third world" because the "we"
becomes a different "we"-it becomes the globalized citizen, the citizens
of the world.2
52
251. Maureen Dowd, Who's Your Daddy Party?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004, at 4-
13 (criticizing President Bush for citing his father as rationale for war in Iraq).
252. Id.
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